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Abstract 
Having an effective and systematic risk analysis and safety management strategy is 
imperative to avoid unwanted accidents in any process facility. Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) is a 
frequently used technique by design engineers for Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA). 
Imprecise, incomplete and vagueness of data can result uncertainty in output from FTA. The 
Dcmpstcr- Shafer Theory of Evidence (DST) addresses the incompleteness in data while fuzzy 
theory handles impreciseness or vagueness in data. 
A computer aided tool for FTA, ExpertFTA- is introduced in this thesis. Both DST and 
fuzzy theory arc considered to develop this software tool in order to aggregate knowledge from 
multiple experts. ExpertFTA can assists users (with little knowledge of FTA) to draw a fault tree 
and perform the analysis effectively. ExpertFTA helps users to create a fault tree, modi fy it and 
store (profiling) data fo r future reference. Users can perform qualitative, quantitative and 
sensitivity analysis of the fa ul t tree from DST and fuzzy point of view. It also provides a report 
based on the generated fau lt tree. Several established des ign patterns arc implemented and object 
oriented concepts of Java, XML and XS LT are used in the development of ExpertFTA. 
one of the currently ava ilable commercial software for FTA has the capability of 
performing ana lys is based on DST and fuzzy logic. This tool is developed with the anticipation 
of using it for research purposes and also for industry personnel fo r detailed risk analys is. It is 
designed such a way that it can be extended with more functionality in the future. 
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Chapter I INTRODUCTION 
1.1 (ht•nir'' 
The current technological era is relying heavily on software. It is inevitable to put more 
emphasis on identifying the risk and implementing the sa fety features for the real time sa fety 
critical embedded systems in a cost effective manner. The most efficient stage to do this is in the 
earl y design phase by identifying the ri sk involved in the system. Identification of risk is the first 
step of risk assc sment and management. 
Risk analys is is an important step in the ri sk management process where consequences of 
any accident and the probability of the occurrences arc identified and analysed in a systematic 
manner. Probabilistic risk assessment (PR A) is a systematic and comprehensive method to 
identi fy and evaluate risks associated with any complex engineered system. According to 
Mansfield et a!. ( 1996a) and HSE( 1996), 80% of industrial accidents are caused by risks 
involved in operation system. Industrial accidents can occur due to human error as well as 
malfunctioning or failure of equipment, such as: pipeline ruptures, vessel ruptures, chemical 
releases, deterioration, design fa ults of a system and software/server fa ilure/malfunction (Pula, 
2005). Table-f . I shows a few examples that illustrate how severe and devastating an industrial 
accident can be. 
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Table 1.1: Example of accidents and its results 
Place of occurrence Date Result 
Flixborough, England June, 1974 28 people dead. The whole plant destroyed and many 
(a Fapor cloud explosion) people injured. 
Bhopal, India December, More tha n 2000 people died and 20,000 injured. 
(a poisonom vapor hurst .fi"Oin a 1984 
pesticide plan!) 
Pasadena. Texas October, 23 people died and injured 3 14 civil ians . 
(a massiFe explosion) 1989 capi tal loss of over $ 7 15 mi llion 
Texas March, 2005 killed 15 people and injured over 170 perso ns 
(a series o( explosions in British 
Petroleum) 
Every year, major and minor industrial accidents are causing billions of dollars loss to the 
company and society. There are some safety management organizations and standards in place, 
such as Occupational Safety and Health Administration's (OSHA), Environmental Protection 
Agency's (EPA), Process Safety Management (PSM) standard and Risk Management Program 
(RMP). An automated tool for ri sk analysis wou ld help industries to do the ri sk analysis 
smoothly and reduce the chance of any accident. 
1.~ \' ll'nl Saft'l,\ ll·rminolog,\ 
The following important terms are defined by Jia X. (2000): 
• Risk: 
" Risk is the possibility of something undesired occurnng. Usually this refers to harm to 
person, property, or the environment, but can refer to any tangible or intangible loss. Safety 
is relative freedom from those risks. Risk is measured by considering the likelihood of the 
undesired events and the magnitude of the attendant losses." 
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• Mishap: 
''A mishap is an unintended event or series of events that results in a loss. An informal 
synonym wou ld be 'accident'. Example of mishaps associated with a nuc lear weapon system 
wou ld include accidental launch of a nuclea r mi ssile, damage requiring repair or replacement 
of the weapon, the unplanned destruction of a nuclear weapon, the radioactive contamination 
of a nuclear installation and its vicin ity, and a nuclea r miss ile boomeranging back to friendly 
territo ry. A mishap for an a ir traffic control system would be a collis ion between a ircraft or 
between an a ircraft and a terrain. For a chemical processing plant, mishaps include 
intoxication and burns to pe rsonnel." 
• Hazard: 
"A haza rd is a state of a system or phys ical situation that, when combined with certain 
environmental conditions, could lead to a mishap. No acc ident or loss has necessaril y 
occurred. A hazard is a prerequisite to a mishap. Whenever the hazard is present, the 
poss ibility of Mishap ex ists . Safety is de fined in terms of hazard rathe r than mishaps because 
mishaps arc caused by multiple factors, and only some of those factors may be controlled by 
the system in question. The ex istence of hazardous state docs not mean that a mishap is 
inevitable." 
It is important to note that during the risk and hazard analysis, the whole system is 
considered. Any component o f the system, such as hardware, di ffcrent event· of the system, 
interactio n be tween other components, connections, environments, and external conditions a rc 
investigated to identify ri sk o r hazard. Probability of mishap and severity of mishap can be 
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paired together to cxpre s risk. Calculating the probability of hazard leads us to the next step 
where probability of mishap is identified given that the hazardous state exists. Calculating the 
probability of hazard cannot define risk; it needs to define losses as well. 
M I LSTD-882(military), HB5300.4(NASA), DE05481 (Nuclear) have categorized the 
severity of mishap as follows(Jia X, 2000): 
Table 1.2: Category of mishap 
Severit!!_ o{ M i.~lwp E{{ects on: Re.mlt(~l 
I. Catastrophic Personnel Death 
Facilities/equipment/ vehicles System loss, repair impractical. requires 
sa lvage or replacement, severe 
environmental damage 
II. Critical Personnel Severe iII ness or injury requires admission 
to health care facility lengthy convalescence 
and permanent i mpa i rmcnt. 
Facili ties/equipment/ vehicles Major system damage, loss of primary 
mission capability, major environmenta l 
da1nagc. 
Ill. Marginal Personnel Minor injury/ illness (medical treatment but 
no permanent impairment). 
Facilities/equipment/ vehicles Loss of no primary mission capability, 
minor environmental loss. 
IV. Neglig ible Personnel Superlicial injury/ ill ness (little or no lirst 
aid treatment ). 
Faci liti es/equipment/ vehicles Loss time is less than one day. Less than 
minor S}'StCm on environment damage. 
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I.J Ri !, \ nal~ ~i ll'thodolo~~ 
Risk analysis is conducted qualitati vely and quanti tatively. Qualitative analysis involves 
identifying the possible hazards with the relevant cause; while quantitative analys is involves in 
investigating the consequences of those hazards in deterministic or probabilistic manner. A 
variety of risk assessment techniques ex ist including HAZOP, HAZ ID, Fault Tree Analysis, 
Failure Mode Effect Analysis, What If Analysis and Event Tree Analys is, PRA, QRA, LO PA 
etc. Techniques to identi fy and rank hazards quantitatively include DOW indices, Mond indices, 
HIRA index, SweHI , IFA L index . 
Some well known risk assessment methodologies are (Ferdous el a!., 2009)-
• WHO methotlologv: 
I. ldenti fica tion of hazards 
( I) Check I ist 
(2) Matrix diagram of integration 
II . Assessment of hazards 
( I) Accident sequence analysis 
(2) Failure effect analysis 
Ill. Accident consequence analysis 
• ISGRA methodology : 
I. Hazard identification 
II . Consequence analys is 
Ill. Quantification of risk 
• Quantitative risk analvsis : 
I. Hazard identification 
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II. Frequency estimatio n 
Ill. Consequence analysis 
I V. Measure of ri sk. 
• Fault Tree Analvsis: 
I. Hazard identificatio n 
II. Top-event identification 
Ill. Frequency estimation 
I V. Measure risk 
Fault Tree Analys is is the one o f the effi c ient technique fo r sa fety/ ri sk ana ly is. 
I A Brief lk cription ofF r \ 
In 196 1- 1962 H. A. Watson a long with A. Merans introduced Fault T ree Analysis (FTA) at 
Be ll Telepho ne Labora tories. It was introduced to s tudy the Minuteman Miss ile launch contro l 
system for US a ir force. S ince then thi s technique has been ex tens ively explored by design 
engineers for PRA. FT A is an analysis technique w hich is bas ically the v isua l representa tion or 
any poss ible causes o f an accident. This technique ass is ts engineers to measure, identify and 
evaluate fa ilure, re liability and availability of a complex system. A complex system can be the 
combination of human and techno logica l entity. T here can be di ffe rent types o f nodes in fa ult 
tree, such as: Bas ic Event (8£), G ate Event (G£), C ondition E vent (C£), Transfer Event ( T£). 
BE is denoted by the c ircle-symbo l w hich represents an event that describes a cause of the 
component fa ilure. A GE is a logical operator that permits or inhibits fa ult logic between inputs 
( lower events) and a s ing le o utput (higher event). A Fault tree can have five d ifferent types o f 
GEs: AN D, O R, Exclus ive-O R, Priority A ND and Inhibit gate. A TE is denoted by a triang le 
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symbol and is the indicator of the sub-tree branch (transfer in/out) of the current tree. A CE is 
denoted by a oval symbol and use to indicate any specific condition or restriction that may apply 
to the logic gate. 
A typical FTA for an industrial system involves several steps, which require large expert 
time, precise probability data, and computational capabilities. Many commercial and academic 
computer-aided FTA tools, including SHARPE, CARA fa ult tree, PROFAT, Rclcx Reliabil ity 
Software, and Fault tree+ have been developed to assist the time-consuming steps of a FT A. The 
bas ic steps, i.e., the rules of graphical network construction, the fa ul t tree development and 
computational time optimization for analyzing a fa ult tree are more or less same for all FTA 
tools. However, a significant difference is observed in evaluation of a fault tree when uncertainty 
due to imprecise and unavailable data becomes a major concern. In tradi tional FT A, the 
probability data of bas ic events are expected to be precise and ass igned as crisp or deterministic 
input, which are often hard to come by for a real industrial system. The crisp fa ilure probabilities 
of such basic events are difficult to measure and the accuracy of such estimation is often 
questionable. This is because in practice, especially in the early des ign stage of a system, there is 
usually not enough data ava ilable. Moreover, many basic events of a fault tree may not have any 
quantitative or probability data at all. Expert 's j udgment/ knowledge in this situat ion is often 
used as an alternati ve to atta in the objecti ve data (Yuhua and Datao, 2005). However, it comes at 
the cost of possible uncertainties related to incompleteness (partial ignorance), imprecision 
(subjectivity), and lack of consensus (if mul tiple expert j udgments arc used). Most of the existing 
FT A tools do not handle this kind of uncertainty and imprecision in input data. In essence, the 
motivation of this work lies in fo llowing three points: 
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• Lack o f an integrated approach to deal with incompleteness in the information for fau lt 
tree ana lys is. 
• Lack o r an integrated approach to deal w ith imprecise and subjecti vity in the information 
for f~tult tree anal ys is. 
• Lack o f a computer aided solution with the advanced features as mentioned abo c to do 
probabi li stic anal ys is of complex process system. 
1.6 Hescarch Objective and Novelty of the Worl< 
In an attempt to c ircumvent the uncerta inty associated in the expert's knowledge, Fcrdous 
et a/. (2009a, 2009b) have introduced two di fferent approaches (i.e., fuzzy-based and evidence 
theory-based approaches) to facilitate the accommodation of expert judgment/ knowledge in 
evaluation o f a fault tree, event tree and bow-tic analys is. In thi s thes is, a software tool - Expert 
knowledge based Fault Tree Analys is (ExpertFTA) is introduced. ExpertFTA is a sophis ti cated 
engineering software tool which incorporates a formal deducti ve procedure to draw and ana lyse 
a fault tree by utiliz ing Fuzzy set theory and Dempster- Shafer Theory (DST) of Evidence for 
address ing and handling the unce rta inties. In order to be c lose-to-accurate and build the 
confidence into FTA, aggregate knowledge from multiple experts is introduced in this tool. 
A software-tool should be eas ily mainta inable and reusable. An efficient des ign and the 
obj ect oriented approach for a software development can assure reusability and mainta inability. 
Severa l established design pa tterns are implemented and object oriented concept of Java, XM L 
and XSL T arc used in ExpertFTA. 
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The novelty of this work can be stated as follows: 
• Developed a unique advanced computer aided tool to perform Fault Tree Ana lysis. 
• Implemented Fuzzy set theory a lo ng with evidence set theory ( i.e. DST) for address ing 
and handling the uncerta inties. 
• Introduced knowledge aggregation fro m multiple experts for indiv idua l bas ic event. 
• ExpertFTA is engineered in such a way that it can be further enhanced w ith mo re 
func tionality. 
1.7 I he i\ Outline 
This thes is consists o f s ix chapters. The current chapter has introduced ri sk ana lysis 
methodo logy and its impo rtance and current practices in the industry. Further, the system sa fety 
termino logy and the brief description of the FT A technique were discussed. T he moti vation and 
research objectives of this work were mentioned in the la ter section o f this chapter. 
The second chapter concentra tes on the de ta ils of FT A steps and the implementation of those 
steps into software. This chapter discusses the importance o f implementing the so ftware in a 
proper manner by adopting certa in des ign pa tterns. From the software evolution and ma intenance 
po int of v iew, acquiring several techniques and models are identified and discussed. Later the 
reason for choosing an appropriate method fo r current purpose is described. DST and Fuzzy 
logic is brie fl y mentioned in this chapter as well. The third chapter illustrates the des ign and 
architect o f the t :'.xpertFTA. In chapter four, the development and implementa tion deta ils of the 
ExpertFTA are discussed. C hapter fi ve presents a comprehensive case study and results using 
this too l. A comparison of ExpertFTA against a few other ava ilable FT A-tools, conclus ions ti·om 
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the current work and a list of future enhancements and directions are provided 1n the sixth 
chapter. 
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Chapter 2 BACKGROUND REVIEW 
This chapter provides a review of different background topics related to this thesis. A 
brief description of FT A (section 2.1 ) along with DST and Fuzzy set theory (section 2.3 & 2.4) 
are provided. Latter, so ftware engineering (section 2.5) from a design pattern and model point of 
view is described. Lastly, a brief overview of XML is provided. 
2.1 Ov ·rview ofF.wlt Tree Analysis (FTA) 
FTA is frequently used in industry to analyze risk and safety. Quantitative and qualitative 
analysis is the main focus of FTA from accident point of view. Following is an overview of 
FTA. 
The root of the logic tree begins with the undesired effect, which is known as the top 
event. After identifying the top event, all possible causes for that event is identified. There can be 
a sequence of events which eventuall y lead the occurrence of the top event. Those events arc 
drawn by using logic symbols along with the probability of occurrence. According to Haas! , 
1965, McCormick, 198 1, Roberts el a/., 198 1, Hauptmanns, 1988, Henley and Kumamoto, 1981 , 
Bil lington and Allen, 1986, Lees, 1996 , Khan and Abbasi, 1999 and AIChE, 2000, a software 
tool for FT A should considers following basic steps: 
i) Gather information about the system. 
ii ) Identi fy the top event. 
iii) Gather probabilities of fai lure of basic events. 
iv) Construct the fa ult tree using logic symbols. 
v) Perform quantitative, qualitative and sensitivity analysis. 
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FT A as a software tool has been ava ilable since in earl y 1970 's (Henley, 198 1 ). T here arc 
some commerc ia l so ftware tools ava ilab le, such as: CARA-Fault Tree (CA RA-Fault Tree, 
vers ion 4. 1, 1999), Faul t Tree+ by lsograph Ltd. and Relex Fault T ree. These tools ca lculate 
quantitative ana lysis by using a conventional probabilistic approach. Imprecision in data has 
been addressed in PROFAT (PRObabil istic FA ul t Tree analysis) (Khan and Abbas i, 1999). 
Fuzzy logic is implemented in PRO F AT to handle the imprecis ion in data, but there a rc some 
unresolved issues on bas ic event data fuzzificatio n and calculatio n of top event probabili ty. 
Moreover, there is no GU t fo r this tool in order to draw and visua lize the fa ul t tree. Until today, 
to our knowledge, there is no FT A-tool w hich has addressed uncerta in ty and vagueness of data at 
the same time by implementing DST and fuzzy set theory s ide-by-side. T he pri mary goal o f this 
thesis is to come up with an ideal so ftware tool which would implement DST and fuzzy set 
theory fro m multiple experts' po int o f view. The fo llowing section discusses the uncertain ty in 
FTA. 
2.2 Uncertainty ch.tractc.-iz.1tion in I•TA 
Several techniques have been developed to fo rmulate the uncerta inty for risk analysis, 
which arc summarized in Table 2. 1 (Wi lcox and Ayyub, 2003). 
Tahle 2.1: Uncertai nty types and formulations 
T ypes Nature Techniq ues 
A leatory Stochastic, Objective, Probabi li ty theory Irreducible, Rando m Ev idence theory (random sets) 
Fuzzy set theory 
Imprecise, Incomplete, Evidence theory (random sets) 
Epistemic Ambiguous, Ignorant, 
In fo-gap theory Inconsistent, Vague 
p-boxcs 
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Uncerta inties can be classified into two categories : aleatory (or stochastic) and epistemic (or 
knowledge-based) (Apostolakis, 1990; Thacker et a/. , 2003; He lton, 2004; Daneshkhah, 2004; 
Ayyub and Klir, 2006). According to the sources and natures of the uncertainty, aleatory and 
epistemic can be further sub-categorized as data uncertainty, model uncertainty and quality 
uncertainty (Abrahamsson, 2002; Markowski et a!., 2009). Usual ly incomplete and 
incomprehensive evaluation of hazards introduces quality uncertainty which is also referred to as 
completeness uncertainty (Markowski et a/. , 2009; Ferdous, 20 I 0). The data and model 
uncerta inties occur due to insuffic ient or miss ing data and consideration of inva lid o r unreal istic 
assumptions (e.g., independent); these uncertainties are respectively known as parameter and 
dependency uncerta inty (Markowski et a /. , 2009; Ferdous, 20 I 0). Table 2.2 provides deta iled 
descriptions of these categories of uncerta inty. 
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Table 2.2: Source of uncertainty in risk analysis 
Category of uncertainty 
Steps Objectives Techniques 
Completeness Modeling Parameter 
Inability to 
Imprecision or 
Identify the identify all vagueness in 
c possible hazards, HAZOP, PHA, Wrong interaction characteristic 0 develop logic contributions to "4J FMEA, between different properties of C1l 
structure of u ri sk and all ~ risk contributors 
...... representative Fault Tree and c and variables contributors and QJ 
accident scenarios Event Tree RAS -o variables 
~ (RAS) . 
C1l 
N 
C1l 
I 
Incorrectness in 
identification 
...... Define the possible of all types of Improper, Lack or inadequacy c Consequence QJ outcomes, the imprecise and E or vagueness Vl Measure degree of inadequate models Vl Models consequences QJ 
adverse impact on for source terms, Vl Vl in values for model <( health, property as well as of all dispersion and QJ variables u 
and environmental interactions physical effects c 
QJ 
:J 
cr 
QJ among 
Vl 
c consequences 0 
u 
c Wrong selection Limited or 
QJ FTA, ETA, of events, unavailable data E 
Vl Wrong analysis for components 
Vl Determine the QJ bow-tie safety function and assumptions failure rates, Vl probability or Vl <( analysis and number of in FTA, ETA and events occurrence 
-o frequency of RAS bow-tie analysis and 0 
0 accident ..c interdependent 
QJ outcome cases relationships 
-"" 
:.:::; 
Limited Inadequacy in Insufficient and c 
selection of 0 assumptions in limited data on 
"4J 
C1l Risk indexes, ri sk external N 
·;:: Risk matrix, appropriate risk 2l ranking or ri sk conditions, and weather 
u SIL, LOPA measures as well conditions, ignition ~ category incorrect 
C1l interpretation of sources and ..c as risk acceptance u 
-"" results criteria population Vl 
a::: 
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In order to address and handle different types of uncertainties conventional or tradi tional 
method, probability theory, fuzzy set theory and evidence theory can be introduced. A brief 
comparison between these three theories is stated below: 
The conventional or traditional method is highly desired and well accepted because of its 
simplicity, input data requirement and minimum analysis time (A IChE, 2000; Abrahamsson, 
2002). Though the traditional method is highl y desired in FT A analys is, it is incapable of 
handling any kind of data uncertainty, which most of the time provide an unreliable analysis 
(Yang and Suzuk i, 1995; Abrahamsson, 2002). Probability theory is the most common method to 
address random uncertainties (Vose, 2008; Ren e!. al .. 2009). However, this requires sufficient 
empirical in fo rmation to derive the PDF (Probability Density Function)s for the inputs 
(Hammonds et a/., 1994; Wilcox and Ayyub, 2003; Abrahamsson, 2002; Chojnacki , 2005, 
Fcrdous, 2009a). Moreover, the class ical MCS (Monte Carlo Simulation) framework cannor 
differentiate random and subjective uncertainties in the uncertainty analys is (Berztiss, 2001 ; 
Abrahamsson, 2002). Using fuzzy set theory and evidence theory, uncetta inty analys is can be 
performed with subjectively assigned fuzzy numbers and basic probability ass ignment (bpa)s by 
the experts (Wilcox and Ayyub, 2003, Ferdous, 2009). Fuzzy numbers are sufficient to address 
the subjective uncertainty, when the empirical information is sparse or completely unavailable 
for the uncertain parameters (Chojnacki , 2005, Ren et a/., 2009, Ferdous, 2009). Unlike 
probabili ty and fuzzy set theory, the hpa in evidence theory is appropriate to represent 
uncertainty associated with ignorance and incompleteness of expert knowledge, and able to 
generalize the overall uncertainty in a belief interval (Bae et a /. , 2004; Chojnacki , 2005). In some 
cases, the fuzzy arithmetic and evidence theory-based formulations are still not well -defined, 
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which often limits their acceptability in risk analysis. Table 2.3 below provides a summary of 
different types of uncertainty form ulations. 
Table 2.3: Summary of different types of uncertainty formulations 
Characteristics Traditional 
Probability Fuzzy set 
Evidence theory 
theory theory 
Analysis com plexity H L M M 
Data requirement H H M M 
Handling data uncertainty 
L L H M due to subjectivity 
Handling data uncertainty 
due to incomplete and L L M H 
inconsistent information 
propagating different L M M M 
uncertainties 
Simplicity in the 
H M L L interpretation of results 
Data aggregation L L M H 
Analysis time H L M M 
Theory acceptance H M L L 
L: Least desired; M: Moderately desired; H: Highly desi red (Ferdous, 2010) 
2.3 h, idence Theot·y Fund,mwr t,ll 
Evidence Theory is also known as DST as it is developed by Dempster( 1967) and later 
extended by Shafer ( 1976). The major motivation worked behind the development of th is theory 
was to characterize the uncertainty caused by partial ignorance, knowledge deficiency or 
inconsistency (Sadiq el a /., 2008; Wang eta/., 2004). Unlike traditional probability theory and 
Fuzzy set theory, evidence theory distributes the subjective knowledge of an ex pert to the 
corresponding subsets of a power set. The unass igned mass due to partial 1gnorance or 
16 
incomplete information is ass igned to an ignorance subset within the power set (Ferdous, eta/., 
20 I I; Sadiq et a/., 2008). 
The major advantages of using the evidence theory include (Sentz and Ferson, 2002): 
i) Individual be liefs from different sources can be expressed through the probability mass 
function that may bear incompleteness from partial to full ignorance, 
ii) A belief interval (a boundary of probability estimation) can be obtained for each 
uncertain parameter, and 
iii) Bias from a specific source can be avoided and conflicts among different sources can 
be resolved through a belief structure. 
Evidence theory genera lizes classical probability theory through a belief interval 
constructed by ass igning upper and lower bounds for probabilities (G uth, 199 1 ). It uses four 
basic constituents: F ame of discernment (FOD), basic probability assignment (bpa ), belief 
measure (Bel), and plausibility measure (PI) to characterize the quality of uncertainty, such as 
probability of basic-events, events or input events (Sadiq et a/., 2008). The theory also includes 
reasoning based on the rule of combination of degrees of belief according to di fferent evidence. 
For a given FOD, (Q) in Figure 2. 1, bpa (mass) is distributed over the set of all possible 
subsets of Q: the power set of Q and written 2fl. The unass igned mass, calculated by 1- m(p) - 111 
(~p) , is ass igned to the belief mass for the ignorance subset. The bas ic formulations for different 
parameters of evidence theory are stated in the following sub-sections. 
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Q = {p, ~p} Ignorance subset 
0 1 
m(-.p} 
Bel (p) ____ ____,,..___ Bel{p, ~p) Bel (not p) 
PI (p) 
Figure 2.1: Formulation of uncertainty us ing evidence theory 
T he tota l subset of a power set (P) in the DST theory is determined by 212 • For example, 
if the number elements of a FOD is two i.e., (Q} = {T , F), then the power set (P) comprises of 
four subsets, i.e ., {(<D, a null set), (T), (F) and (T, F)}. 
The basic probability assignment (bpa) in DST theory represents the knowledge 
proportion of every subset {p;) in the power set (P) such that the sum of the proportion is I. T he 
hpa is denoted by m(p) and can be de fined with the Equation I : 
m(p . )---7 [0,1] 
I 
; m(ct>) = 0 ; :L>n(pi) = I 
pi <;;;; p 
( I ) 
The lower probability bound- belie/(Bel),for a set p;, is defined as the sum of all the hpas 
of the proper subsets Pk that support the minimum knowledge of interest p;, where Pk r:;;.p;. The 
Bel is written as: 
Bel( p i) = m(p ) k (2) 
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The upper probability bound, 1.e., the plausibility (PI) measure for a set Pi is the 
ummation of hpas that support the max nnum knowledge including the 1gnorance subset. 
Therefore, the relation can be written as: 
Pl(pi) = (3) 
2. '·2 h.IJO\\ letl!_!l' ( omhination J<nll'' for I>S I 
The combination rules in DST allow aggregation of di fferent degrees of belie f fro m 
different ex pert 's knowledge and provide a combined belief structure (Fcrdous et a/., 20 I 0). The 
Dempster and Shafer (OS) rule is fundamental among all combination rules in evidence theory. 
A number of modificati ons of the OS rule on the basis of minimization and normalization o f 
conflicts among the different sources have been reported (Sentz and Ferson, 2002; Sadiq et. a /. , 
2008). The most common modi ftcations include those by Yager, Smets, I nagak i, Dubois and 
Prade, Zhang, Murphy, and more recently by Dczcrt and Smarandache (Sadiq et a/. , 200R). 
Detailed di cussion and comparisons of these rules can be found in Dczert and Smarandachc 
(2004). To address two extreme cases of conflictions, high-conflict and non-conflict issues in the 
ex perts ' knowledge, OS and Yager combination rules are used in this study. The details of these 
two rules arc given below. 
i) OS rule of combination: Dempster's nt!e ol combination (DS) uses a normalizing 
factor ( 1-k) where ' k' is the sum of all bpas with conflict. This method ignores the 
conflicts between two sources (eg. m1, m2) by dividing the combined evidence with 
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that factor. DS combination rule uses Equation 4 to combine evidences from di ffcrcnt 
sources: 
0 
z:/n1 (Pa )x 111 3 (pb) 
Parl fJb= pi 
1- k 
.for P; = </J 
(4) 
ii ) Yager rule of combination: Yager( 1987) proposed a similar method as DS but more 
robust where the degree of conflict is very high among the sources (Sentz and Fcrson, 
2002). The difference between DS and Yager rule is that the degree o f conflict (k) in 
Yager is not used for norma lization. It is directly added up with part of ignorance n. 
The equations uses in Yager arc as follows: 
[111 1 EB 111 , ]( p . ) = 
- I 
). t ~ "B( "I sin 1.1tinn 
0 
L1111(Pa)xml (ph) 
Parl fJh = pi 
"'L.m1(p0 ) X 111 3 (ph)+k 
Parlpb= pi 
.for P; = cP 
(5) 
.for P; = Q 
The interva l obtained from the belief" and plausibility measures g ives the belief structure 
of expert knowledge. The be lief structure takes into account the ignorance and conflicts in multi-
expert knowledge and provides a range for the event probability. "Bet " estimate in DST 
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prov ides a po int estimate in belie f structure (similar to defuzzification), which is estimated by 
Equation 6. In equa tion 6, IP;I re fe rs the cardina lity (number of clements) in the set p;. 
bet(P) = I 
Pep. 
- I 
2.. t- Fuzzy Set Theory (fST} F md.un 'nt.ll 
(6) 
In 1965, Lotif Zadeh introduced his pioneer work: fuzzy set theory, where he argued tha t 
the conventiona l probability theory is no t su ffic ient to express the intens ity (degrees) of truth in 
subjecti ve in fo rmation. It introduced robustness into QRA (Quantitative Risk Ana lys is) by 
a llowing a certa in amo unt of imprecis ion to ex ist, thus paving the way to represent human 
linguis tic te rms as fuzzy sets, hedges, predicates and quantifiers (Rivera et a/ .. 1999). Many 
disc iplines inc luding contro l systems, neura l networks and artific ia l intelligence have adopted 
this concept. Fuzzy set theory (FST) is fl ex ible enough to trans la te the expert 's linguis tic 
vari able in probability domain and deal wi th subjective uncerta inty due to imprecis ion or 
vagueness in data. 
FST uses the fuzzy number to describe the relationship between an uncerta in quantity p 
(e.g ., event probab ility) and degree o f uncertainly through membership function fl. Any type o f 
mem bership function including normal, bo unded and convex functions, e.g., tri angula r, 
trapezoida l and Gaussian shapes, can be conside red fo r the fo rma tion o f a fuzzy numbe r. 
However, the se lection of a function essentia lly depends o n the variab le characte rization and 
ava ilable information (Ferdo us, et a/. , 20 10). The TFN (Triangula r fuzzy number) can be 
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described by a vector (pL. Pm· pu) tha t represents the lower bo undary, most likely va lue, and 
upper boundary of the uncertain quantity . The a -cut for a T FN represents the degree o f 
membership of p1 in the set P. The membership function of a TF can be described as Equati on 
7: 
Pr - Pt. Pt. ~ PI ~ Pm 
Pm- Pt. 
Jl t• (p I )= Pu - Pr 
Pm ~ Pr ~ Pu (7) 
Pu - Pm 
0 otherwise 
'L L I I u11:y \rithmcltc Opet·.1Lion · 
T he a.-cut based formulations a rc simplified and commonly used arithmetic operations of 
FST (La i et a/., 1983; Siler et a/., 2005; Li , 2007). T hese operations arc perfo rmed at each 
correspo nding membership va lue o f a a.-cut for adding, subtracting, mul tiplying, and dividing 
ruzzy numbers to determine overa ll opera tion results on the fuzzy sets (Wilcox and Ayyub, 
2003 ). Fcdo us et a /. (2009a) explored fuzzy arithmetic operations for describing the dependent 
and independent re lationship between bas ic events or events in FT A and ETA. The current 
ExpertFTA tool cons idered that the interdependence among the bas ic events in FTA is 
independent. In other words, basic events arc independent in ExpertFTA . In Table 2.4, the 
inte rsection and conj unction rules fo r "A ND" and "OR" operations for FT A arc shown. 
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Table 2.4: a -cut based fuzzy arithmetic operations fo r FT A 
Rule Operation a-cut formulation 
II II 
Conduction "OR" gate pa = I - n ( I - pa) ; pa = I - n ( I - pa) 
L i = l IL N i = l Ill 
Intersection "A D" gate 
L 1.2 vtultiplt> Expt>rt's l'nowl('dgc ggreg.ttwn 
Knowledge aggregation from multiple experts becomes essentia l in an ana lys is . It pools 
multiple sources of knowledge into one and provides a mutual agreement o f di ffc rcnt sources of 
knowledge (Lin and Wang, 1997). A number o f methods, e.g., max-min, arithmetic averaging, 
quasi-arithmetic means, weighted average method, fuzzy De lphi method, symmetric sum and t-
nonn, arc ava ilable to aggregate multiple experts knowledge in the fo rm of fuzzy numbers 
(Huang et a /. , 200 I ; Sadiq et a/., 2007; Wagholiar, 2007). The weighted average method is the 
s implest method a llowing aggregation according to prior weights o f the arguments. It uses the 
fo llowing equation for aggregating m ex perts knowledge. 
"' 
"" \ V p ~ J I . J 
p =-'-' =_1 _ _ 
I Ill 
i = 1.1.3 , .. .. . 11 (8) 
L: w, 
, - 1 
where Pij is the linguistic expression o f uncerta in input basic event i elic ited fro m cxpcrt j, 
n IS the number of input events, m is the number o f ex perts, wi is a weighting facto r 
correspo nding to expert j and Pi IS the aggregated fuzzy number. For equall y weighted 
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knowledge, the weighted average method gives a similar estimation to the arithmetic averaging 
method. 
L 1.3 DPiunillc.tlion 
Dcfuzzification in FST transforms a fuzzy number into a c risp va lue (Kiir el of., 200 1). 
Many defuzzification methods arc ava ilable in the litera ture (e.g., Klir et a/. , 200 1; Ross, 2004). 
T he weighted average method is a computationally e ffi c ient method (Ross, 2004; Khan el a /., 
2005). T he fo llowing equation is used for defuzzification of o utcome event probabili ty or 
frequency. 
P Oll l 
2:: ~~ r(P ) . ?] 
2:: f-L r(P ) 
L l. ~ lph.t rut llt'lt•rmin,tlion 
(9) 
T he a-cuts arc used to determine fuzzy inte rvals ( i.e. , nested intervals in a fuzzy number) 
with a membershi p grade (!lr) greater o r equal to the a-cut va lue (Wi lcox et a/., 2003). In a TFN, 
the membership function uses the fo llowing re latio nship to determine the interva l at the a -cut 
level: 
p 
a 
[p L + a (p m - P L ) , P 11 - a (p ~< - P m ) ] ( I 0) 
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L ~ 'l Fllt.I.V Lingui..,lic V.triable 
Fuzzy linguistic variables a re linguisti c terms to articulate uncerta inty 111 probability 
estimation. Experts' knowledge can be expressed in terms of linguistic va riables such as very 
high, high, medium, very low, low, etc. (Ayyub, 199 1; Wu,2006, Sadiq et a/., 2007). 
Very low low Medium High Very High 
1.0 
0.5 
0.0 
0 0. 20 0 .25 0.40 0.45 0.60 0.65 0.80 0.85 1 
Figure 2.2: Example o f fuzzy linguistic sca le 
2.5 Di ·cussion on Softw.tre Ue\<'lopment 
In order to implement the theories described above, a long with a GU t (G raphical User 
Interface) , it is important to deal w ith software development care full y. It is imperati ve to adopt a 
solid so ft ware engineering technique in the very early stage of software development. A concre te 
so ftware eng ineering technique in volves considering or choos ing appropriate design pauern(s) 
and process mode l. T he fo llowing sub-sections brie fl y discuss design patte rns and process 
models and a lso, O bject O riented Programming (OOP) concepts . 
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Z.:>.l I> •<,tgn P.tll<'l'll 
C hristopher Alexander articulated the concept of patterns which he proposed in his book 
The Timeless way ol Building (Alexander, 1979) and A Pat/ern Language- Town. Buildings. 
Constructions (Alexander et a/. 1977). The essence of his concepts is that every recurring 
problem follows some patterns. Certa in numbers o f patterns are needed in order to confine the 
essence of a ll a rchitectura l designs. Unlimited architectura l design can be accomplished by 
adopting and combining those patterns. Software de ign a lso resembles architectura l design. The 
so lutio n of the most commonly encountered problems in software design is described in sojill'are 
design patlerns. The main purpose of using software design patterns arc as follows: 
i) To help so ftware des igners by providing summarized cxpenencc from van o us 
software designs in a few des ign patterns. 
ii ) To increase the confidence of the designer in o rder to reuse the proven design 1n 
so ftware systems. 
iii) To provide common vocabulary for software designers. 
Gamma ( 1995) in Design Patterns first introduced twenty three most commonly used 
software des ign patterns . Those patterns arc divided into three categories : Creational Palfem s. 
Structural Patterns, Behavioural Patterns. The third chapter provides the discuss ion about these 
ca tego ries . 
.... ), > ':iofl v.tn• P1 ou•<,. ~1odt'l 
An abstract descriptive representation for a particular large and complex software system 
can be de fined as software process model (Sommerville, I. 200 I). Basically, it is a road map 
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which inc lude the descriptions o f a ll necessary steps and tools in order to implement a so ftware 
product successfully (Bell , D. 200 I). To deal w ith ever increasing s ize and complexity o f 
software systems, software development process has been improved drastica lly over time. 
Software development is no longer just writing code and fi x ing bugs when it is encountered; 
rather, w ith the passage o f time, it is now evolved to a full-fledged comprehens ive li fe cycle. 
Different phases can be involved in a software paradigm which may inc lude requirement 
analys is, design, implementa tion, debugging, testing, deployment and ma intenance. In order to 
handle di fferent c ircumstances, di fferent process mode ls can have mo re or less phases and in 
di ffe renl orders. T hat is why, based on the proj ect's nature and co nstraints, an appropriate model 
should be selected . There are four maj or and most common process mode ls which arc bric lly 
described be low: 
i) Waterfa ll model: 
In 1970, this model has introduced by Royce (Royce, W.W. 1970). This mode l 
cons ists of requirement gathering, design, implementatio n, testing, deployment 
and maintenance phase. This is a sequentia l process where in order to proceed to 
the next phase; earlie r phases have to be fini shed. Hence, the main disadvantage 
of this mode l is that, if any error occurs, it can o nl y be identified during 
deployment phase. O nly the fully completed vers ion is given to the user. Lack o f 
end user interaction makes it hard to get any comments from the user in earlie r 
stages. 
ii) Incrementa l model: 
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Basili , V.R. and Truncr, A.J . introduced the concept of the incremental model in 
1975. This model is essentially the composed of a series of waterfa ll -model and 
combines certain phases as a cycle. Here, user requirements are well defined in 
the beginning of the project. This model is useful for the projects in which user 
interaction and feedback is important during the development because this model 
allows users to get an evaluation version of the project in almost every cycle. 
iii) Prototyping model: 
This model was introduced by Floyd, C. in 1984 which also known as the 
evolutionary model. This model is based on the concept of improving the 
prototype system in multiple iterations. Specification, development and testi ng arc 
done here concurrently and the final version of the software fu lfills the 
requirements of the user. 
iv) Spiral model: 
For high risk and complex projects this model is suggested, although it is a bit 
complex and costly. This model was introduced by Boehm, B. W in 1988 where 
he combined the features from the above three models. By combining those 
features, th is model enhances the users' in teraction and risk management at the 
same time. For the project in which req uirements might change frequently and it 
is crucial to be verified by the end-user, this model is ideal. 
For ExpertFT A purpose, the requirements are well defined, as well as the theories which 
will be implemented. Users' interaction is hardly needed in the implementation phase. The 
Waterfall model is chosen for this software. In add ition, ExpertFT A is designed in such a way so 
that futu re enhancement wi ll be very easy. 
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2 . .:-. ~ Ohjl:ll Orkutcd l'rul,!r:lliHllill!! tOOl') 
Programming and design are two distinct tasks in the object-oriented paradigm; however, 
they are more tightly interlinked than in the conventional programming paradigm. Capture 
system's desired behaviour by using notations (such as the Unified Modeling Language: UML) 
is the main goal of object-oriented ana~vsis and modeling: on the other hand, o~ject-oriented 
design concentrates on creating an architecture for implementation. One o f the fundamental 
principal of the object-oriented approach is modularization: a software system is decomposed 
into highly cohesive and loosely coupled modules. 
In OOP a class (module that includes data structure, functionalities/bchav iours and state 
of the module) can be instantiated multiple times as required and each instance is referred to as 
an object. A particular object can also be derived or inherited from another class. In that way the 
code redundancy can be optimized. Updating or modi fy ing the state of an instance of a particular 
object will affect all of the instances of that o~ject . A method of an o~ject is essentially a 
placeholder (block of code) to perform a specific task or operation which can be invoked through 
an instance of that class. Sending and receiving messages to and from an ol?ject is performed via 
a method. The advantages of OOP are as follows: 
• System's behaviour or functionalitics can be abstracted and encapsulated through 
interfaces (contains only method's signature) and classes (which may implements 
interface(s) or extends another class) with methods respectively; 
• An entity or interface can have multiple interchangeable implementations, which 
is defined as polymorphism; relationships among classes and interfaces can be 
defined through inheritance, which eliminates redundant data specification. 
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• OOP provides a solid framework for the software and also improves mai ntenance, 
fac i I itatc enhancements and code rcuti I ization. 
The concept of OOP provides a powerful mechanism for in formation storage, retrieval 
and evaluation. Fault-tree analys is is basically a concise tree representation. It consists of 
different kinds of gates and basic events which can adopt this concept precisely. Due to the fact 
that a so ftware tool like ExpertFTA is of moderate complex ity contains large number of classes 
to distribute its logic, computation and 110 functionalities, maintenance and refactoring becomes 
complicated if it is not designed smartly in the initial phase. 
2.6 ML 
XML (Extensible Markup Language) is an interoperable, easily readable (both by human 
and machine) and self-descriptive document. The specifica tion to encode the XML document is 
defined in XML 1.0 by W3C (The World Wide Web Consortium to develop the web standards). 
Compared to any relational database, XML is very light-weight, reading and writi ng is faster, 
and portable to different platfonns without any di ffi culties. In addition to all those advantages, a 
particular database does not need to be installed and main ta ined to get those facilities. A database 
is mostly useful where large volume of in formation and di fferent type of relational data needs to 
be stored in a secured environment. As such, in this case, t :".xpertFTA needs to store recent and 
retrieve previous straight-forward and light-weight infonnation. Hence, XML seems to be the 
most suitable choice for the current purpose. 
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Chapter 3 ExpertFTA MODELLING AND DESIGN 
This chapter describes the design of the ExpertFTA tool. After giving an ovcrv1cw of 
fundamental structure and operational steps of computer-aided Fault Tree Analys is, this chapte r 
illustrates the requirements ana lysis, overview of the GU t and other major phases of 
development. A brief summary of lessons learned while designing this tool is a lso given towards 
the end of the chapter. 
3.1 Compute1·-aided Fault Tree Analysis 
From an earlie r discussion ( in previous chapters), it was conc luded that the FTA is a 
complex technique which essentia lly requires a user friendly, optimized software tool. In order to 
develop a suitable tool requires a detai led understanding of so ftware engineering. The FT A-tools 
developed so far ma inta in common fundamental structures and operationa l s teps . Figure 3.1 
shows basic operationa l steps adopted in a traditional computer-a ided FT A. 
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STEP I 
SYSTEM DESC RIPT ION 
nderstand operation 
or the system 
+ 
STEP 2 
H AZA RD ID ENTI FICATION 
Identifi ca tion of top event 
STEP 3 
Spcci llc to FAULT T R EE C ONSTR UCTION 
Fault Tree Ana lys is 
Develop fa ilure logic 
! Use "AND" and "OR'' gates Proceed down to basic event Computer codes lo r 
la rge Iin dt tree 
" 
STEP4 
QUALITATIVE EVALUTION 
Minimal cutsets analysis 
Re liability Data lo r Insight into a ll failure modes 
• Component 
Q ua litati e ranking of importance 
• Operator 
Susceptibility to common-cause fai lure 
c 
Response 
+ omputer codes fo r large O PT IONAL ST EP fault tree STEP 5 SENSIT IV ITY 
" 
QUANTIT J\ T l VE EV J\LUJ\ T IO ANALYS IS 
Top event frequency Basic Events importance 
Boolean or ga te-by-gate approach Cutsets impo rtance 
Figure 3. 1: Operationa l s teps for FT A (a fte r A IChE, 2000) 
Figure 3.2 depicts the faul t tree development structure as per Henley et a/. ( 198 1 ). This 
fi gure illustrates the d ifferent type o f events used in FTA. T he undes ired incident (e.g. leakage, 
fire and explos ion) that needs to be further analyzed is treated as a top event and placed on the 
top o f the fau lt tree. 
32 
Undesired Event 
(Top event) 
The fault tree consists of sequences of events that lead 
to the system failure or accident 
Logical dependency of events are expressed by AND, OR or 
other logic gate 
J ] 
The events above the gates and all events that have a more basic 
cause are denoted by rect angles w ith the events described in 
rectangle. 
I I 
The sequences fi nally lead to a basic cause for which there is failure rate data 
available .The basic causes are denoted by ci rcles and represent the limit resolution 
of the fault t ree. 
Figure 3.2: Fundamental structural diagram of fault tree (Henley eta/. , 198 1) 
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Failure or error in a system or component that causes the undesired event is termed as the 
basic event and placed on the bottom of the tree. Basic events are connected through logic gates. 
There arc di fferent types o f logic gates: AND, OR, Exclusive-OR, Priority-A ND and Inhibit 
Gate. A fault tree can also consists of intermediate events, external (initiating) events, 
undeveloped events, conditioning events and transfer in and transfer out. In the subsequent 
section, fault tree analysis tool development is discussed from a so ftware engineering point of 
V ICW . 
{.2 H, p ·rU:TA Requit·emenls 
The primary objective of this work is to implement Fuzzy set theory and DST in FT A. 
The goal is not to implement all of the fea tures of the fa ult tree once. It is rather to keep the fault 
tree as simple as possible and to observe how accuracy can be regained from implementing 
advanced concepts. To achieve this goal, it is decided to implement the most basic features o r a 
fault tree and keep GU I as simple as possible. That being said, the current version of ExpertFTA 
will only include the symbols for basic event, AND and OR gate; implementation of the 
remaining symbols are not essential to accomplish the present research objective. The 
in termediate event is not considered, instead, any gate or basic event will be joined with its 
parent-event directly. In addition to those above points, the fo llowing requi rements arc expected 
to be handled in ExpertFTA : 
I) The fault tree must be analyzed using Fuzzy set theory and DST so the user can 
compare the results and make a fruit ful decision. 
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2) Following the Fuzzy route, there has to be a fuzzy-scale available to input data. 
Users need to be able to construct their own fuzzy-scale; so that they won't be 
restricted by any pre-defined fuzzy-scale. 
3) Three different options for input wil l be avai lable: "Fuzzy Scale", "Most-Likely 
Value" and "Crisp Value". 
4) Abi lity to aggregate knowledge from multiple experts for both Fuzzy and DST 
route. 
5) In DST, users should be able to choose from different combination methods (e.g, 
Yegar, DS) for each basic event input. 
6) Abil ity to perform sensitivity analysis in Fuzzy route by a lpha-cut evaluation. 
7) Result from both routes should be provided as gate-by-ga te probability 
calculation. 
8) In DST route, Bet-estimation should also be included wi th gate-by-gate 
probability calculation. 
9) Any kind of input should be captured and stored into XML lilc for future 
reference. 
I 0) Finally, a well-formatted report should be generated by the app licat io n. 
T he following two sections describe the modelling (section 3.3) and design (section 3.4) or 
ExpertFTA respectively to accomplish the above requirements. 
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3.3 F 'l'ertl·T!l Modelling 
This section ta lks about the software modelling o f ExpertFTA from the users interface 
po int of view. To provide the user a s implest form of user-interface, the tabbed-nav igation 
pattern is being selected . Once the user fini shes drawing the fault tree and proceed to insert data, 
o ne tab w ill be created (based on the selected logic mode : Fuzzy/ DST). Upon fini shing ass igning 
the data , the user w ill be able to view the calculated result in ano ther tab. A s imila r procedure is 
fo llowed fo r both logic modes. If the user uses both logic modes for ana lyzing the fault tree, he 
can go back and fo rth to view any tab at any time . Be low a few screen models arc described 
inc luding the w ire framc drawing. Wire frame is the graphical representation o f the functional 
overv iew, often called the blueprint. 
L ~ I 'Dr.nv F.mlt J'n•c" lnterf.!Ce 
T he very fi rs t tab is dedicated to drawing the fault tree. There are ho rizonta l and verti ca l 
pa lettes w hich conta in eli ffe rent command-buttons and symbo ls. A canvas is placed at the cente r 
of the screen where the fault tree can be drawn. T here arc a few rules w hich the user needs to 
ma inta in while drawing the fault tree. O therwise, the application will info rm the user to fix it and 
w i II not process the request. T he rules are: 
I) A particular gate has to be selected prior to adding any event underneath it. 
2) Only a particular (eithe r AND or O R) gate can be placed underneath the top-
event. No mo re than one gate can be added and a lso no bas ic event is allo wed fo r 
this position. 
3) A gate or a basic event cannot be placed underneath any bas ic event. 
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4) A gate must conta in at least two child-events (might be combination of gate and 
bas ic event) associated with it. 
ExpertFTA is structured to fo llow the top to bottom approach. User w ill start drawing the 
t~llllt tree from the top event and fini sh with the basic events. 
Below, Figure 3.3 depicts the w ircframe of the " Draw Fault Tree" Screen. 
FTA 
: Option menu : 
Comm and Button palatte 
Symbol 
Palatte 
Drawing canvas 
;S91ect logic mode ie" DST ·:) Fu;:;:y Finish J Cancle 
Figure 3.3: Wire framc of "Draw Fault Tree" interface 
O n the bottom of the screen, there is an option-panel from where the user can choose the 
log ic mode ("Fuzzy" or " DST") and press "Finish" button to move to the next screen ( i.e. "Input 
parameter"). 
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The " Input parameter" screen for Fuzzy set theory will be slightly different from DST in 
terms of appearance and functionality. This screen is divided into two sub-screens. The left sub-
screen contains all the bas ic events information which are present in the fault tree. There is a 
button (named "Expert 's Knowledge ... ") beside each basic event ID. 
Funy Input parameter I J, 
r · · · · ····· · ·· · · · ··· - ····- ---- -- - - - - ---- - -- ., 
· · · ···:. ··· .~ --- - ····· - --- - - .... ... ..... ..... TI 
Choose Srale T ,oe 1 I j '[ i 
1
- I 
!P 1 • P2 . P3 I I 
·- I. '· ' I I 
Save Add... l 
De find ,our IJWn Fuzz., L~ngwstlc Scale I Define 
[ EJE_ l f - [8 Expert's j r·· knowle<l_ge... := C1 
P1 •1'2 PJ . . 
l,_ . I • I 
·----- -- ------ ---------- ----- --- ·-· · · ---- -- ---- , 
Calculate 
Fm1sh ; Cancel 1 
Figure 3.4: Wireframe of Fuzzy " Input Parameter" interface 
This button fac ilitates the user to enter input-value from multiple experts fo r that particular bas ic 
event. In the right sub-screen, once the user adds input-va lue from a certain expert and clicks the 
"Save" button, the va lue is temporarily saved and displayed on the bottom of thi s sub-screen. By 
clicking the "Add ... " button, the user gets another simil ar panel undemeath the current panel to 
input va lues from another expert. Once the user is fi nished entering values and clicks the 
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"Finish" button, this will store the calculated value for the current basic event is stored. On the 
bottom of the right sub-screen there is a "Calculate" button, which calculates the result based on 
the prov ided input va lues for all basic events; if any of the basic events do not have va lues 
associated with them, an error message is shown. 
In the Fuzzy " Input Parameter" screen , at the top o f the right sub-screen, there is a button 
called "Define" which enables the user to construct a Fuzzy Linguistic scale. Deta ils about the 
"Fuzzy Linguistic Scale" Screen are discussed in the next section. The user can choose di ffcrcnt 
scale (from Scale-type combo-box) w hile entering input fo r each expert. Figure 3.4 above shows 
the wircframc of the Fuzzy " Input Parameter" screen. 
In the DST " Input Parameter" screen, bes ide the common functionalitics, the user can 
choose frame of discernment as well as combina tion method (DS o r Yeger) to ca lculate Belief 
and Plausib i I ity. 
LJ Ful.ly Linglll'illr 'cile" lntl'I·I,Hl' 
This screen will facilitate the user to construct a Fuzzy Linguistic scale which can be 
used during the current sess1on of this applicatio n. At first, the user dcccidcs how many 
categories need to have in this scale and ass1gn a meaningful name for these categories. 
Afterwords, the user needs to select the type of va lue for each category (i.e. TFN or ZFN). Upon 
choosing the value type for categories, the user sees the subsection to assign the boundary va lues 
for the categories. Once the user c licks the ' 'Save" button, the application stores it for further usc 
during the current session. Figure 3.5 provides the wircframc of this screen. 
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Figure 3.5: Wireframe of"Fuzzy Linguistic Scale" interface 
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O nce the probability calculation is fini shed for the entire fa ult tree, the user can v iew the 
result and perform some ana lysis (depends o n the calculation mode that has been selected earli er) 
on it. For both logic modes (DST and Fuzzy), the le ft sub-panel contains the results o f each gate. 
In addition to that in DST mode, there will be " Bet" estimation of each Gate as well. O n the 
other hand, in Fuzzy Analys is, Alpha-cut estimation can be performed on the right sub-pane l. 
Finally, the user is able to generate a de ta iled report on the current fault tree by c lic king the 
"Generate Rcpori " button at the bottom. Figure 3.6 depicts the "Fuzzy analys is" sc reen. 
Fuzzy Analysis . I' 
. 1,,/ 
r . .. ... . -· ... ... .. - - . - .. - ---- - -.---.---- - . , 
[ .!'.:;:t:..~-.1?;:! 
Gate ID. J l _P1__ - - ., ~ p) l • Aiphil -CUI I 
' - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ 
. --.--.--.-- .. -- -- - --- - -. , 
' . Generate Report 
- ' 
·-- - - - --- - --- - - --- --------
Figure 3.6: Wireframe o f "Ana lys is" interface 
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T his section is divided into two sub sections to describe ExpertFTA design from a fo rmal 
work-flow and design-pattern point of view. 
!. L t Worl flow ot Fq~L·rti' I I 
T he work- fl ow diagram of a particular phase o f the application prov ides a visual 
overview of different actions or steps which take place in that phase. In this section, di ffe rent 
phases of the application are investigated from a des ign po int o f view and provides work llow 
diagram to illustrate these. 
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NO 
NO 
YES 
Figure 3.7: Work-flow diagram of drawing tree 
Figure 3.7 shows work flow diagram of drawing a fa ult tree on the canvas. Drawing a 
fau lt tree starts w ith the s ingle gate, not with the basic event. Any gate event must contain at least 
two or more events (it could be gate or basic event) . A bas ic event cannot have an event as a 
child associated w ith it. 
Figure 3.8 is a complete overview of the work-flow in ExpertFTA . Once the fault tree is 
drawn and log ic mode is selected, it validates the entire fa ult-tree before proceeding further. This 
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is the initial validation phase where it checks whether all gates and basic events arc placed 
appropriately according to the rules. 
In Fuzzy mode, the user can de fine the linguistic scale prior to entering an input value fo r 
any basic event. The user can also undo the ex isting linguistic scale and redefine, if necessary. In 
order to input a value for any basic event, a particular scale has to be selected. The entered value 
will be validated prior to saving; knowledge aggregation can be performed by adding addit ional 
experts for input values for the same basic event. The user must input valuc(s) for all basic 
events in order to calculate the result. 
Simi lar to the Fuzzy mode, in DST, multiple experts knowledge can be inroduccd for a 
s ingle basic event. For each basic event, a frame of discernment (FOD) needs to be selected and 
for each expert, a combinat ion method (DS/Yagcr) has to be selected. The application wi ll 
va lidate the input value and also check whether all required options arc selected prior to sav ing. 
A report wi ll be generated by pars111g the XM L file and us111g prede fi ned XSL T 
(Extensible Stylcsheet Language Transformations) dedicated to the report. The application wi ll 
validate the XML file prior to parsing it and impose the XS LT on it. 
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Figure 3.8: Work flow diagram of the ExpertFT A 
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ExpertFTA has been designed by implementing multiple design patterns to handle its 
complex functionalities. These include Factory Method (Creational Pattern), Adapter (Structural 
Pattern ), Command and Mediator (Behavioural Pattern). Two of them (Command. Mediator) arc 
brie fl y described below: 
In Mediator design pattern, communications between objects arc encapsulated within the 
Mediator object. Objects in the entire system interact with each other through the Mediator. The 
relationship between the control class and other participating classes is multi-directional 
(Gamma, 1995). By using this design pattern , ExpertFTA gains a centralized control to 
manipulate participating objects, simplifies the protocol , improve objects reusability and lowers 
the coupling. Figure 3.9 depicts the component model of all modules in ExpertFTA which uses 
the Mediator design pattern. 
The GU I module in figure 3.9 needs to be addressed seperately to illustrates its design. 
Figure 3. 10 depicts the component model of the GU imodule. This module of ExpertFTA has 
adopted the concept of Blackboard architecture. The Blackboard architecture model is a 
distributed computing architecture where a common data structure is shared by multiple 
agents/systems. 
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Figure 3.9: Component Model of ExpertFT A 
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Figure 3.10: Component Model ofGUI 
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In the GU I module the fo llowing information or metadata is stored in memo ry: 
• Number of levels in the fa ult tree. 
• umber of items (gate or basic event) in a particular level. 
• Type of calculation (DST or Fuzzy). 
• User defined Fuzzy scale. 
• Multiple experts' knowledge for each bas ic event. 
This too l a llows users to undo or remove any gate/basic event added to the Fau lt-Tree. In 
order to suppo rt the undoing o f actions, the Command Pattern, which trea ts actions as objects 
(Jia, 2003), has been implemented. The intention of this design pattern is to encapsulate any 
action of the ExpertFT A as an object. The partic ipants of the Command design pattern arc the 
fol lowing: 
• Command (e.g., Command, undoableCommand), which defines an interface to perform 
or undo an action. 
• Receiver (e.g., Analyzer), which knows how to perform actio ns. 
• ConcreteCommand (e.g., CommandAnalyzcr), which implements the Command interface 
and de legates the execution of the action to the Receiver. 
• Client (e.g., fdftaGUI.KeyListencr), which creates the concrete commands and binds the 
concrete commands to their receivers. 
• Invoker (e.g., Analyzer), which asks the command to carry out the actio n. 
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Figure 3.1 1: Command model ana lys is 
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This chapter has provided the description o f the ExpertFTA from the design and 
modelling po int of view. Some o f the important lessons learned are as fo llows: 
• While des igning a complex software system, it is c ruc ial to pay attention to the deta ils of 
the requi rements. By observ ing those requirements, workflow d iagrams and w ireframcs 
of possibl e screens a re developed . These a rc the in formation which can be cruc ia l as well 
as in formative for further development. 
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• Selecting the ri ght design pattern(s) is a maJor task to develop a complex tool. By 
identifying appropria te des ign pattern(s), one can get c lear overvtew of the ent ire 
development phase. 
50 
Chapter 4 ExpertFTA SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter concentrates on describing the overa ll a rchitecture as well as the development 
o fthe ExpertFTA . 
4.1 HxperlfTA n:hilccture Overview 
As a lready discussed in earlier chapte rs, it is very important to make sure that a ll objects 
and modules in software have low coupling and high cohesion. By keeping that concept in mind, 
ExpertFTA is architected in such a fashion so that it re fl ects that in a ll possible areas . 
Figure 4. 1 shows an overv1ew o f the a rchitecture of the ExpertFTA fro m different 
module point of view. In that fi gure, each module shows the different functionalitics that it 1s 
respons ible for. For example, "GU I" module contains a ll the functionali ties to deal w ith the 
interactio n w ith the fault tree. It sho uld be noted that the " Draw and construct Fault Tree" is not 
the name of an object; rather it is the description of the funct ionality that belongs to this 
particular module. As Figure 4 .1 depic ts that the Mediator module is the core of the archi tecture 
which a lso includes the Command des ign pattern . The rest of the modules arc independent from 
each other and communicates through the Mediator module. In th is way modifying any of the 
modules will not affect the others. Below each module are discussed fro m the functionalitics 
point of view. 
T he "GU I" module creates and facilitates the user with a canvas to draw and modify the 
fa ult tree. Creating a ga te or BE (basic event) object is done fro m this module. Though this 
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module handles knowledge aggregation and constructing Fuzzy Lingui stic Scale, these two 
functiona litics are defined as separate entity or module. 
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Figure 4.1 : ExpertFTA architecture overview 
The " Analyzer" module contains a ll of the functionali tics associated w ith analysis, such 
as qua litative, quantitative and sensitivity analysis. 
ExpertFTA is architcctcd such that in future ETA (Event Tree Analysis) also can be 
implemented for both Fuzzy and DST analysis. Some of the core functionalitics of the ETA arc 
already developed and implemented which can further be enhanced to make it full y functional. 
'Tree Constructor" module depicts those functionalitics. 
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T he " Data_ Profile_ Handler" module prov ides the functionalities that is required for this 
tool to a provide data pro filing mechanism. These inc lude handling XML fil es and genera te 
PD Fs by rende ring XS L T. 
T he " Rules_ Algorithm_ Handle rs" is the module which is bas ica lly responsible for a ll 
sorts of calculations inc luding alpha-cut estimation, Be t estimation, data fuzzyfication and top 
event probability calculation. 
4.2 ExpertFTA Functionalities Overview 
A t the very firs t screen of constructing a Fault Tree, the user can draw his/her desired fa ult 
tree by j ust c licking on the appropriate gates/ bas ic event symbol. Upon fini shing drawing the 
tree, the user selects an option from " DST" or " Fuzzy" as a log ic mode for calculation. Based on 
the selected option, the applicatio n gathers necessary information as the user proceeds with 
inserting va lues. By choosing " DST", the user gets a screen where he/she can insert multiple 
experts' knowledge for a pa rticula r basic event. By choosing " Fuzzy" as a logic mode, the user is 
able to define his/her own fuzzy linguistic scale a long with the above knowledge aggregation 
option for a s ing le bas ic event. And the " Most Like ly Va lue" scale in this logic mode w ill 
convert the entered va lue into a fuzzy da ta set by implementing a triangul ar/ trapezoida l functio n. 
As the user adds or connects gates and basic events w ith the f'a ult tree, thi s tool w ill create 
an XML fi le behind the scene. From reusable aspect, XML is ideal because the user can eas ily 
re fe r to the previous fil e and a lso modi fy that fil e in future if needed . This fil e a lso becomes 
handy w hen it needs to be ana lyzed or port to o ther systems or env ironments . 
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O nce the calculation is fini shed, the 'A nalysis· tab is displayed fo r the selected logic mode. 
In both cases, the 'Analysis' tab conta ins the gate-by-gate results for the entire fault-tree. In the 
fuzzy-ana lysis tab, in addition to that result, the user can a lso be able to perform an a lpha-cut 
calcula tio n. In the DST- analysis tab, the result cons ists o f " Bet" estimation for each gate. 
Finally, the user can generate a PDF-repo rt which captures the va lues o f each gate, bas ic events 
and also a ll information gathered from ex perts. 
1-. ~~ H.:1sic Tree Gcncr.1tion of the F.lllll-Trcc 
A Fault-tree co nsists of a top-event, basic events and logic-gates. Each of them is trea ted 
as a node and represented by an object. Two kinds of gates, AND and OR, arc sub-classes o r 
logic-gates with their own characte ristics. Each bas ic event is a lso be de fined as an object. T he 
ad vantage of encapsulation (hiding the implementation deta ils from object point of view) and 
polymorphism (that a llows di fferent functiona lities to be handled us ing a uni form intert~1ce) fro m 
object has acquired here. Figure 4 .2 illustra tes the object orientation for di ffe rent events in 
ExpertFTA . 
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Figure 4.2: Di fferent types o f events and gates 
The graphical user inter face of ExpertFTA enables users to draw a fault tree by inserti ng. 
de leting or adding events. Canvas is the area on the screen where the fa ult tree gets d rawn by the 
user. In orde r to draw a tree and add/remove any events fro m it, ExpertFTA divides the canvas 
area in to 'Level's. Every single node of the tree falls in to a specific Level. Th is tool mainta ins a 
collection of these Level structures and gets automatically updated upon any modi ficat ion in the 
fault tree. At the beginning of the program, co-ordinates of the canvas area get evaluated based 
on the users ' screen s ize. For every node in the tree, the drawing-area co-ordinates of that node 
get ca lcu lated and a rc s tored into the object. While the tree gets updated, the program re-
evaluates each node's drawi ng-area co-ordinates and Level structure recurs ively . An indiv idua l 
node or obj ect has knowledge about its own drawi ng-a rea co-ordinates and Level structure that it 
belongs. If any new gate or bas ic event gets added in any level of the tree, the program assigns 
an appropriate id to it based on the previo us event 's id of the same type. Upon deleting an event, 
a ll events of that type gets re-evaluated in order to re-ass ign the new id. 
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4 . .f. Object Orient.tlion and f.ontJ·ol Flow 
O nce the user fini shes drawing the des ired fa ult tree and c licks the "Finish .. button to 
proceed further, the application creates objects for each symbols in tha t fault tree. Afte r that a 
tree validation is performed in order to veri fy that a ll gate objects have a t least two children 
events connected w ith it. Then the application creates (or re freshes if it is a mod iti cation in the 
existing tree) a XML fil e. This XML fil e is initialized with attribute nodes for the se lected Logic-
Mode (" Fuzzy" or " DST") and the current system time. An XML node gets created and 
appended according ly fo r each object created by the application. The Gate node conta ins id (e.g. 
"GATE_ l"), gateType ("AND" or "OR"), value (ca lculated va lue which is empty initia lly) and 
Bet (Bet estimatio n) a ttri bute-nodes a long with child node(s) for any child object(s) coupled w ith 
this gate. The BasicEvent node also conta ins id(e.g. " BE_ I") and value (combinatio n o f expert's 
knowledge va lue which is empty ini tially) attribute-nodes. Any expert's knowledge gathered fo r 
this particular bas ic event gets added as a child node (named as ExpertOpinion ) of this 
BasicEvent- node. An id (e.g. "Expert_ I") and value (va lue ente red by the user for this ex pert) 
arc two attribute-nodes associated w ith the ExpertOpinion-node. 
Table 4 . 1 gives a brief idea about the s ignature o f c lasses and methods that descri bes 
here. FaultTreeGate is an object which represents a gate of the fault tree. This object mainta ins a 
collectio n of child(ren) associa ted w ith it. T he method "calculateResult(. .. )" in this object is 
respons ib le for invoking "calculate(. .. }" method on a specific logical operat io n and pass the 
current child-collection to it. This object a lso contains a method which is responsible fo r 
calc ulating Bet (ca lls 'calculateBet() ')based on the logic-mode. T here are two objects to handle 
logical opera tions: 'AndOperation ·and 'OrOperation ·. Both objects iterate through the chi ld li st 
and recurs ively traverse the entire tree to calculate the fina l result. The property 
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FaultTreeGate. is Vis ited is used m order to avoid unnecessary mul tiple access of a certain gate 
during tree traversal. 
Table 4.1: Constructor and method signature of di fferent events 
Java Class Constructor's Signature Method's Signature 
Fwti!TreeGale Fatti!TreeGule(Sirillg gmeType. Siring galeName. douhle(J calculaleResu/1 (Siring login\ lode): 
Faui!TreeGale pareul): mid calcu/aleBei{Siriug logici\4ode): 
hooleau is l'isiled(}: 
AudOperalitJIJ A m /Operal iou( Lis!< Basic£ Fen/ In FT A> has icE 1 ·enls): sialic BigO.:cimalff mlculale(Li.'I<F!al/eln" j iE/emenls. 
Siring d,·f_jic=_l): 
OrOperalion OrOpemliou(Lisi<Basic£\•em lnFTA > hasicE•·enls): sialic BigDecimalf f calculale(Li.'·f<...Ffallem> !iE/emellls. 
Siring ds!_)ic:r) : 
I··,,==•·Prohtthilil\' F!I::_I·Prohahi/i(I'Cciiii 'C'r/or() lmpi:oia/Com•ersiou(} : 
Colll'erlor I ria11g tt!arCc " '' ·el·silllt(}: 
Basic£,·enlluFTA BasicE••enlluf111(Siring eFelll/0. Siring paren!/0) ClllllhilteExtJeriK!uJ\l'ledges(} 
Selecting a logic-mode (Fuzzy/ DST) before clicking the "Finish .. button determines which 
object will be instantiated for the next phase. 'Fuz::.yE.xpertlnputPanel' and 'DST!nputPane/ ' arc 
the two objects that are responsible to interact with the user to get input in the next step. If either 
of these objects are already instantiated, then it gets updated by the latest change in the faul t tree. 
FuzzyErpertlnputPanel permits the user to construct a new fuzzy linguistic scale to usc duri ng 
the current session. By clicking the ''Define" button the user gets a screen where number of 
category in the scale incl uding the suitable linguistic variable name can be assigned. Also upon 
selecting the membershi p function (TFN : triangular fuzzy number or ZFN: trapezoidal fuzzy 
number), the same screen provides an option to ass ign corresponding fuzzy values (e.g. for TFN : 
Lower, Most likely and upper bound) for the particular user defined category. Once the linguistic 
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scale is saved, this is ava ilable for assigning a fuzzy va lue in the current session. In both logic-
modes, for each BE. knowledge aggregation has to be performed at least w ith one expert's 
opmton. DST!nputPanel enables the user to choose from FO D type ("!m e/false" or 
"success/failure") during individual basic event 's knowledge aggregation and calculation method 
(DS/Yagcr) fo r each expert 's opinion. Upon c licking the "Calculate" button on the screen, data 
va lidation is performed by checking completeness and consistency of va lues for a ll the BEs. And 
a lso invokes appropriate procedures to calculate top event 's probability and show the gate-by-
gate results o n the nex t tab. 'A nalysisPanel ' is the object which is respons ible to show the resul ts 
and the a lpha-cut calculation sub-panel based on the se lected logic-mode. In the a lpha-cut 
ca lculation sectio n, the user can check the results for any entered va lue in the alpha-cut input 
box. Though the calculation for ZFN has been implemented, it is not yet usable fro m GU I. 
t.S Converting Probability Dal.t into Fuzzy or DST D.1t.1 
Fuzzy probability uses the fuzzy number, which is expressed by a fuzzy set and 
characte ri zed by its membership function, ~L. It can be represented by a triangular o r trapezoida l 
shape or be ll shaped membership function (Cheng ct a l. , 2000). 
A java c lass, Fu::.::.yProbahility Converlor. fuzzify the provided data for BasicEvent!nFTA . 
T he method- trapi::.oiaiConversion() and triangularConversion() of that class is responsible fo r 
converting data. Table 4 .2 and 4 .3 represents the implementation strategies for TFN and ZF 
respective ly: 
58 
Table 4.2: Implementation strategies for TFN 
Strategy 1: Strategy 2: 
0 ~ M ~ 0.5 0 .5 ~ M ~ 1.0 
Lower bound value PL = M x 0.5 Lower bound value PL = (3*M -I )/2 
Upper bound value Pu = M x 1.5 Upper bound value Pu = (M + I )/2 
Based on the given "most likely value" the application wil l generate a lower bound and an upper 
bound value by implementing logic stated table 4.2. In that table, " M" stands for "Most likely 
value". 
Table 4.3: Trapezoidal conversion strategies 
Strategy 1: Strategy 2: 
0 ~ /}_ ~ 0.5 0.5 ~ {} ~ 1.0 
Lower bound value P;A= ~ X 0.5 !1 = ( 1- ~)/4 
Lower bound value P;13 = ~ x 0.75 Lower bound value P;"= (a -(2 X )) 
Upper bound value P;c = ~ x 1.25 Lower bound value P;n = (a- l1) 
Upper bound value P;D = ~ X I. 5 
Upper bound value P;c = (a + l1) 
Upper bound value P;n = (a + 2 X l1) 
Note: 'l = Prvhahilifl' value. a = Fu::::v Numher 
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1-.6 Kn rwledgc Aggt·cg<lliou fm· DST !Ising Matri Computation 
In DST, fo r multi-experts' knowledge aggregation, the combinatio n rule requires matrix 
computat ion in order to merge the knowledge into a belief structure. A number of matrices can 
be generated based on the number o f distinc t combinations o f experts/sources. For example, if 
user gathers knowledge from three independent sources (m 1, m :>. m3), there w ill be three matrices 
m 163 1'11 :>. m 1$ m3 and m :> 63m3. The fo llowing algorithm is developed to generate the number of 
possible combination fro m the given set of expert knowledge: 
fori = I to n- I 
jorj = i+ l ton 
m ; ffi m; 
end 
end 
Each clement in the combination is treated as a column-vector and row-vector respecti ve ly 
and the computed matrix is the result of the outer product of the combination. This square (11 x 11) 
matrix's ·n · is equa l to the number of the subset of the power set (P}. By neglecting the null set, 
we have tota l 2" - I number o f rows (and columns). 
The java c lass- BasicEventlnFTA contains a method- combineExpertKnowledges() that deals 
w ith the above operations. This method returns an object o f type ExpertsOpinion. 
ExpertsOpinion IS an interface implemented by two classes, SingleErpert and 
CombineTwoExperts . T he class CombineTwoExperts requires two experts knowledge, which 
need to be passed as arguments during object-construction. Table 4.4 shows the pseudo-code of 
combineExpertKnowledges(). 
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Table 4.4: Pseudo code of knowledge combination 
+ comhineExpertKnow/edges(): ExpertsOpinion 
1/ Sing leExpert then 
ExpertsOpinion -7 Sing le Expert: 
Else: //.for multiple experts 
For number a./ experts 
ExpertsOpinion = Combine TwoExperts(Expert;. Expert;): 
Expert; -7 ExpertsOpinion: 
End of/or: 
End oj'ij;' 
Return ExpertsOpinion: 
I In t ·sc tio n 111<-1 tn ·: 
Intersection Matrix (1M) shows the intersection of each subset of power set (P) with 
one another. For example, if Q = {T , F/ (where. T = " True .. and F = "False "), then tha t 
leads to four subsets, i.e ., {¢J (a null set), {T/, {F/, {T , F}} in power set (P). And by ignoring 
the null set, we have 3x3 matrix as in Table 4.5: 
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{T} 
{F} 
{T,F} 
Table 4.5: Matri x representation of Q 
{T} {F} {T, F} 
T 0 T 
0 F F 
T F T ,F 
From the matrix in Table 4 .5, the intersection value(s) fo r ·r·. 'F'. 'T.F' and 
'Conflicts · a re identi fied accord ing ly. T hose distinct pos itions can be sto red in one-
d imensiona l a rray: 
T = [ /M(/. 1), /M(/.3). IM(J,I) ] 
F = [ ! M(2.2). I M(2,3). IM(3.2) ] 
T ,F = [ IM(3.3)] 
Conflicts = [ /M(/, 2), IM(2. /)] 
(I ) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
T he above collectio ns a re handy whi le computing result by usmg the selected 
combination rule . T he Java c lass- CombineTwoExperts, computes a matrix by o uter produc t of 
the g iven data and ex tracts the val ues from the resultant matrix us ing the knowledge o f the above 
prede fined collections . 
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4.7 ll~e1· view of Ev.pcrtFTA 
A presentation o f the users view and workflow is outl ined below. Figure 4.3 depicts the very 
firs t screen where the user can draw the fa ult tree by c licking the symbols from the symbol 
palette w hich is on the le ft s ide o f the screen. Symbo ls which arc not currently available arc 
greyed out. By double-c licking on the specific gate in the fault tree, the user can select that gate 
and a s ingle mouse c lick on the pa1ticula r symbol from the symbo l palette appends it w ith the 
selected ga te. The application a llows the user to delete any selected BE or gate (and any sub-tree 
underneath it) from the tree by just c licking the delete icon. As the fa ult tree is ex tended, it may 
become too la rge to be v iewed on the canvas. Hori zonta l and vertica l scro ll bars of the canvas can 
be used to nav igate around in order to view the hidden areas of the tree. The user can a lso usc the 
'zoom in· and 'zoom out · icon in order to increase and decrease the zoom va lue of the enti re fault 
tree on the canvas respectively. 
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Figure 4.3: A screenshot of ExpertFTA 
4.8 Fuzzy Input Parameter sueen 
The '·Fuzzy Jnput Parameter" tab enables the user to view the one-to-one re lation with each 
gate and BE. Figure 4 .5 shows the screenshot of thi s tab . One of the key features of this tool is 
defining users ' own linguistic scale for Fuzzy input. Before inserting va lue for BE. the user 
needs to construct the linguistic scale by c licking the " Define" button. 
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Figure 4.4: A screenshot of "Fuzzy Input parameter" 
As the user clicks the " De fine" button, the program prompts a separate screen ( Figure 
4 .6) to construct the linguisti c scale. Once the user fini shes creating the scale by c licking the 
"Save " button, the application stores it in memory for late r use. T he "Expert 's knowledge ..... 
button enables a detailed input screen fo r that particular BE. 
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Figure 4.5: A scrccnshot of"Fuzzy Linguistic scale" screen 
Figure 4.6 represents the detail input screen for BE_ l. User can choose different scale 
type from the combo-box in order to assign va lue for a certain "Expert" . C urrently available 
scales arc: 'Linguislic Scale" . .. Mas/ Like!\' Value" and "Crisp ". Choosing "Linguistic Scale " 
provides the fuzzy variab les which have been defined earlier and selecting any one from that list 
populates the placeholder for " P 1", "P2" and ''P3". "P 1", " P2" and " P3 ,. essentially stands for 
" Lower··. " Most likely" and " Higher" bound. 
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While "Most Likely value" scale prompts an input-box (as shows o n the Figure 4 .6) to 
enter error-factor value from which " PI " and " P3" gets calculated according ly, "Crisp" scale 
enables " PI " tex t fi e ld to enter the va lue. The user has to c lick "Save" button to store the input 
va lues fo r the specific "Expert" and "Add . . . " button to add another " Expert" fo r the current BE. 
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Figure 4.6: A screenshot o f " lnput Deta il" screen 
O n the bottom o f the input-deta il screen the tota l average " P 1'', " P2" and " PJ" is shown 
fo r the particular BE (as shown in Figure 4.6). The user has to c lic k the "Finish" button in order 
to te ll the program that entering va lues for the BE has completed. O nce a ll BEs values arc 
entered, upon clicking the "Calculate" button the user va lidates a ll BEs and calcula tes the gate-
by-gate probabili ty. 
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T he " Fuzzy Analysis" sc reen (as shown in figure 4.7) shows the gate w ise result on 
the le ft hand side of the screen. And alpha-cut calculation can be made on the right hand 
side of the screen. 
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Figure 4.7: A screenshot of"Fuzzy Analysis" screen 
When the user c licks the "Generate Report", a PDF (Portable Document Format) file is 
created with the date and time stamped on it. Figure 4.8(a) and figure 4.8(b) shows the 
generated report from the example in Figure 4.3 . 
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Figure 4.8(b): A scrccnshot of fuzzy report (continued . . . ) 
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ExpertFTA generated the following XML file which has been parsed by the XSL T 111 
order to create report: 
Table 4.6: Example of the XML fi le 
<?xml versiOn=" L. O" encoding = "UTF-8" standalone= "no" ?> 
.: < FaultTree LogicMode = "Fuzzy" curTime= "Thu Oct 27 22:03:49 NOT 2011"> 
.: < Gate Bet="" ID= "ROOT_ ITEM" gateType= "ROOT_ITEM" value = "" > 
.: < Gate Bet = "0.0142" ID = "GATE_1" gateType = "AND" value = "0.0091, 0.0192, 0.0240" > 
.: < BasicEvent ID= "BE_ 1" va lue ="0.1001, 0.2002, 0.3001" > 
< ExpertOpinion ID= "Expert_1" va lue = "0.1001, 0.2001, 0.3001" /> 
< / BasicEvent> 
.: < Gate Bet ="0.4443" ID= "GATE_2" gateType= "OR" value = "0.5271, 0 .3614, 0.2241"> 
.: < BasicEvent ID= "BE_2" value= "0 .0701, 0.1402, 0.2102" > 
< ExpertOpinion ID= "Expert_1" value= "0.0701, 0.1401, 0.2101" /> 
< / BasicEvent> 
.: < BasicEvent ID= "BE_ 3 " value = "0.3951, 0.5051, 0.6151" > 
< Expe rtOpinion ID= "Expert_ 1 " value= "0.3401, 0.5601, 0 .7801" /> 
< ExpertOpinion ID= "Expert_ 2 " value= "0.45, 0.45, 0.45'' /> 
</BasicEvent> 
.: < Gat e Bet ="0.1070" ID= "GATE_ 3 " gateType- "AND" value= "0.0631, 0.1508, 0.2631" > 
.: < BasicEvent ID= "BE_ 4 " value = "0.1001, 0.2002, 0.3001" > 
< ExpertOpinion ID = "Expert_ 1 " value = "0.1001, 0.2001, 0.3001" /> 
</BasicEvent> 
.: < BasicEvent ID "BE_ 5 " value = "0.6295, 0.7531, 0.8767" > 
< ExpertOpinion ID= "Expert_1" value="0.6295, 0.7531, 0.8766" /> 
</BasicEvent > 
</Gate > 
</Gate > 
.: < BasicEvent ID= "BE_ 6 " value= "0 .1718, 0.2641, 0.3563"> 
< ExpertOpinion ID = "Expert_ 1 " value = "0.1845, 0.369, 0.5535" /> 
< ExpertOpinion ID= "Expert_ 2" value = "0 .159, 0.159, 0.159" /> 
</BasicEvent> 
</Gate> 
</Gate > 
.: < Alpha-Cut_ Value ID ="Alpha-Cut_ Value" > 
<Alpha-Cut 10 - "0 " va lue= "0.111, 0.0103, 0.0192, 0.0235" /> 
<Alpha -Cut ID = "l " value= "0.456, 0.0138, 0.0192, 0.0219" /> 
</Alpha-Cut_ Value > 
</FaultTree > 
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4.9 DST Input Parameter Screen 
Similar to the " Fuzzy Input Parameter" screen, for DST, the program creates a " DST 
Input Parameter" tab which depicts the one-to-one relation with each gate and BE. Figure 
4.9 shows the scrcenshot of"DST Input Parameter" tab. 
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Figure 4.9: A scrccnshot of ''DST Input parameter" 
Upon clicking the "Expert Knowledge .. . " button for specific a BE, the user gets the input 
details screen for that BE. Initially the user needs to choose the type of FOD. Currently two types 
of FOD ({True/False], {Success/Failure}) arc predefined by the application which can be 
selected from the combo box. By choosing an appropriate FOD, the user can apply it for every 
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expert's knowledge aggregation for the particular BE. For each expert's knowledge aggregation, 
the user has to choose the combination method (' DS'/ ' Yager') prior to clicking the "Save" 
button to store the entered va lue. Once the "Save" button is clicked, it becomes disabled, and if 
the user makes any change in the input va lues, the program re-enablcs this button. Same as 
Fuzzy input detail screen, the "Add. .. '' button appends another row for the next expert. At the 
bottom of the input detail screen, the total calculated "Belief' and " Plausibility" fo r the entered 
values are shown. "Finish" and "Calculate" button have similar functionalities as Fuzzy input 
detai I screen. 
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Figure 4.10: A screenshot of"DST Analysis" 
As Figure 4. 10 depicts that the "DST Analysis" tab show the gate-by-gate results of 
"Belief', " Pl ausibility" and "Bet" calculations accordingly. The ''Generate Report" button 
creates a similar PDF report as described for the "Fuzzy Analys is" screen (section 4.8). 
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klO ~lllllll,try 
Thi s chapter has provided the description of the ExpertFTA from the architectural poin t of 
view. This also described the implementation details of some major clements in this tool. Later 
in this chapter, user interface of the ExpertFTA has elaborated to show the functional ities of this 
tool. 
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Chapter 5 CASE STUDY AND RESULT 
This chapter discusses the application of the ExpertFTA using a case study. Result from 
the case study is also provided. 
S. 1 Lt o..;p Study 
An earlier published real life study has been adopted here. The study is published by Sadiq 
et a!, (2008) in ''Predicting ri sk of water quality failures in distribution networks under 
uncertainties using fa ult-tree analysis". Here Sadiq et el. investigated two studies of water quality 
fa ilure in Canada: North Battle ford (Saskatchewan, in April 200 I) and Walkerton Ontario( in 
May 2000). To veri fy the applicability of ExpertFTA, it is decided to choose the case o f 
Walkerton Ontario. 
), 1. t ')uhjedivc (FnZly-R<lsed) 1\pp ·o.tch 
To demonstrate the subjective (Fuzzy-based) approach feature o f ExpertFT A, the 
probability of basic events arc defined using the linguistic expression and TFN values which arc 
stated in Table-5. 1. These values have been taken from the same case study (Sadiq et el.. 200H) 
and used to develop a fuzzy scale for the case study using ExpertFTA and also to ca lculate the 
TFN of the top-event. 
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Table 5.1 : Fuzzy linguistic scale 
ID Likelihood Triangular Fuzzy 
Number(TFN) 
I Absolutely low (0, 0, 0.1) 
2 Extremely low (0, 0.1' 0.2) 
3 Quite low (0. 1' 0.2, 0.3) 
4 Low (0.2, 0.3, 0.4) 
5 Mildly low (0.3 , 0.4, 0.5) 
6 Medium (0.4, 0.5, 0.6) 
7 Mildly High (0.5, 0.6, 0.7) 
8 High (0.6, 0.7, 0.8) 
9 Quite High (0.7, 0.8, 0.9) 
10 Extremely High (0.8, 0. 9, 1.0) 
II Absolutely High (0.9, 1.0, 1.0) 
Table 5.2 depicts the Names, Descriptions and Values considered for Basic Events for the 
case study. Values for "Expert-2" and "Expert-3" have been considered randomly whereas 
"Expert- !" val ues are adopted from Sadiq et el .. (2008). 
Table 5.2: Name, Description and Value assumed for Basic Events 
Basic Name Description Expert I Expert 2 Expert 3 
Event ID 
BE I Source water Raw water contaminat ion Mildly Low Medium 
-
potential low 
BE 2 Treatment units Conditions of the treatment Mildly Medium Mildly 
units in the plant before High low 
water enters the 
distribution system. 
BE 3 Untrained staff Lack of knowledge, Mildly Mildly Medium 
experience and education High low 
BE 4 Broken pipes & Risk of water quality Low Quite low Mildly 
gaskets failure due to broken pipes low 
and 
gaskets throughout the 
water distribution system 
BE 5 Maintenance Risk of water quality Low Quite low Mi ldly 
and failure due to the intrusion low 
repair events of 
contaminants during 
maintenance and repair or 
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pipes and other 
components of the 
di stribution system. 
BE 6 Cross- Risk of water quality Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
connections failure due to the intrusion low low low 
of contaminants at the 
cross-connections of the 
distribution system. 
BE 7 Loss of pressure Likelihood of pressure loss Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
-
low low low 
BE 8 Presence or Likelihood or Low Quite low Mildly 
contaminants contaminants' presence low 
BE_9, Metallic surface Risk of water quality Extremely Absolutely Extremely 
BE II fa ilure due to leaching in High High High 
-
the absence of a metallic 
surface. 
BE 10 Leaching Conditions conducive to Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
-
conducive leaching leading to risk or low low low 
conds. water quality failure. 
BE 12 CotTosion 
-
Risk of water quality Qui te low Extremely Low 
conducive fa ilure due to corrosion low 
conds. likelihood of conditions 
conducive to corrosion. 
BE 
-
13 Threat Direct and indirect threats Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
to the di stribution system low low low 
BE 14 Physical & Gco. Risk of water quality Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
-
vulnerability failure due to the low low low 
surrounding physical and 
geographical vulnerabi lity 
of the system. 
BE 15 Insufficient 
-
Risk of water qua lity Low Quite low Mildly 
monitoring fai lure due to insufficient low 
monitoring in a 
distribution system. 
BE 16, Organic matter 
-
Risk or water qua lity Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
BE 19 fai lure due to DBP low low low 
-
!"ormation 
likelihood of organic 
matter 
BE 
-
17, DBP conducive Risk or water qua li ty Quite low Extremely Low 
BE 20 conds. l"ailurc due to DBP low 
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formation 
under likelihood of 
conducive conditions 
BE 18 Concentration of Risk of water quality Quite low Extremely Low 
-
residual failure related to low 
disinfectant disinfectant 
loss under likelihood of 
residual disinfectant 
BE 21 Disinfectant loss Risk of water quality Quite low Extremely Low 
conducive failure related to low 
conds. di sinfectant 
loss under likelihood or 
conducive conditions 
BE 22 Plastic Plastic material present or /\bsolutely Extremely Quite low 
not low low 
BE 
-
23 Hydro carbon Hydro carbons are present Absolutely Extremely Quite low 
or not around the pipe low low 
BE 24 Pcrmcat ion Exposure of hydrocarbons Absolutely Extremely Quite low 
conducive to plastic material over low low 
conds. long time 
BE 25 Organic matter Presence of optimal Extremely Absolutely Absolutely 
organic matter for the low low low 
growth or 
biofilm 
BE 26 Detention time The time water stays in the Quite low Extremely Absolutely 
system (water age) low low 
BE 27 Bio fi lm Temperature, nutrients etc. Quite low Extremely Low 
conducive low 
conditions 
!l.l ' 1: 1 I ·nc · I'h •orv·B.I';ed Appro.H h 
To demonstrate the evidence theory-based approach feature o f this tool, a case s tudy was 
a lso performed using the same fa ult tree. Figurc-5.1 shows the screcnshot or the entire fault tree 
(zoomed-in to fi t on the screen) which has been drawn for DST (Dempster- Shafer Theory o f 
Evidence) analys is. 
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Figure 5.1: Screen shot of the case-study 
5.2 Results 
Table 5.3 shows the possib le combinations of ana lyses conducted on the fa ult tree using the 
same input values. Appendix-A provides the deta iled output generated from these studies. Table-
5.4 il lustrates the result observed from each ana lys is. Using the fuzzy-approach a long w ith single 
expert 's opinion as input g ives identica l results that stated in Sadiq et el. (2008 ). 
Table 5.3: Possible combinations of ana lysis 
Single Expert Multiple Experts 
Fuzzy-approach X X 
Evidence theory X X 
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Table 5.4: Probability of water quality fa ilure in Walkerton Ontario 
Feature Uncertainty Range Point Estimation 
Single Expert: [0.0, 0 .00 19, 0.0 I 04] Sinele Expert: 0.00 19 
Subjecti ve uncertainty 
(Fuzzy) Multiple Experts: [0.000 I, 0.00 19, 0.0 I 14) Multiple Experts: 0.00 19 
Uncertainty due to Single Expert: 0.0237 0.0267 Bet: 0.0252 
1gnorance Multiple Experts: 0.0088 0.0 124 Bet: 0.0106 (DST) 
Table 5.5 depicts a companson of error robustness performed us1ng fuzzy approach, 
evidence theory and traditional approach as per Ferdous et el (2010). It is observed that by 
introducing 20% uncertainty in input data, the fuzzy and evidence theory-based approaches 
measured almost 0.24% and 9% deviation respectively, whereas 65% dev iation is observed in 
the result of traditional approach. Therefore one can state that the fuzzy based approach is more 
robust compared to other approaches; moreover introducing multiple experts ' opinion definitely 
gives improved results. 
Table 5.5: Error propaga tion for di ffercnt approaches 
Likelihood of VCE (OE1) 
----------------------------------------- D 
Approaches 
* Defuzzified value/ Bet I Deterministic 
estimation (Percentage 
---------------------------------------- Deviation) 
Estimated 
uncertainty 
with 20% Estimated with 
Fuzzy-based 0.413 
Evidence theory 
- 0.328 
based 
Traditional 0.126 
uncertainty 
0.412 
0.360 
0.360 
no 
0.24% 
8.88% 
65.00% 
* Defuzz ified estimation for the fuzzy-based approach, the Bet measure for the evidence theory-based approach and 
deterministic estimation for traditional are used to estimate the likelihood 
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5.J Summary 
In this chapter a case study is performed using different analysis approaches. The results of 
the study along with the discussion on the error robustness of different approaches arc also 
presented. 
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Chapter 6 COMPARISIONS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter provides a comparative study between ExpertFTA and avai lable FTA tools. 
Latter, conclusions and recommendation for the future work is provided. 
h. I < 'omparath t' study 
In 1970 (Hen ley, 198 1 ), the first computer based FT A was developed. There arc several 
techniques such as Diagraph Based Methods (Lapp and Powers, 1977 and 1979), fault tree 
construction by formal methods (Fussell , 1973), Rule Based Methods (Elliott, 1994 ), and Loop 
Based Methods (Shafaghi, 1988) which are adopted for FT A-tool. Many researchers and 
software companies have worked on automated FT A-tools. Brief overview of some of those 
FT A-tools are given below: 
CARA-Fault Tree: CARA-Fault Tree (CA RA-Fault Tree, vers10n 4.1, 1999) is a Microsoft 
Windows based program for top-down construction of fau lt trees. The modulari zation technique 
is implemented here. The complete tree is scanned to check for the repeated input in any sub-
trees. Each module is treated as an input event and the probabil ity calculation arc done 
recursively for every module. This tool has implemented the MOCUS (Mi nimum Obta ined Cut-
Sets) a lgorithm to produce minimal cut-sets. Each module will appear as an input event in the 
minimal cut-sets. So the modularization option should not be used if the user requires the list of 
minimal cut-sets. 
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Fault Tree+: lsograph Ltd.'") has Developed Fault Tree+ which runs under the Microsoft 
platform. This tool (Version 11.0, Demo) can handle large and complex fault tree. It can also 
analyze and produce full minimal cut-sets. 
Windchill FTA: Windchill FTA (formerly Relex Fault Tree) was introduced by PTC'"1• This tool 
provides an efficient user interface that allows users to create a fault tree on a window. It uses the 
idea of modeling a fault-tree in terms of a series of smaller fau lt trees. An analytica l approach is 
used to calculate and display the probabilities of the events and gates at a mission time. Key 
features are: enforcing correct fault tree logic, outputting key system metrics which includes 
unrcl iabi I ity, unavai labi I ity, frequency and number of fai lures etc. 
PROF A T: The package PROF AT (PRObabilistic FAult Tree analysis) (Khan and Abbas i, 1999) 
is based on an analytical simulation methodology. This package reduces the imprecision and 
ambiguity of probability analysis of a fau lt tree by incorporating probability analysis wi th fuzzy 
sets. Although this package has the capability to analyze large and complex trees using a 
modularization technique, it has no graphical interface. User can not draw a fault tree by usi ng 
this package. 
A qualitative companson amongst a selected set of FT A-tools and ExpertFT A is 
performed. From the results shown in Table 6. 1 it is observed that the most of the tools such as 
Windchill FTA , CARA-Fault Tree, FaultTree+ and PROFAT are unable to handle ignorance 
in data, knowledge aggregation from multiple-experts and user-define fuzzy linguistic scale. 
Except PROF AT, rest of the tools do not consider vagueness and ambigui ty in input data. 
Though PROF AT handles subjective uncertainty by implementing fuzzy set; it fa ils to account 
epistemic uncertain(v owing to ignorance or incompleteness of an expert' s knowledge (Ferdous 
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et a!., 20 I 0). And also, this package does not provide a graphical user interface to draw and 
visualize a fault tree. 
On the other hand, the proposed tool , ExpertFTA, has features which make it unique. 
ExpertFTA not on ly deals with uncertainty but also handles incompleteness and ignorance in the 
input data. One powerful feature of this tool is that the user can define a suitable linguistic fuzzy-
scale such that the analysis is not restricted or stuck with pre-defined fuzzy-values. In each case 
of analys is (Fuzzy/DST), the user is able to input basic event's value by aggregating knowledge 
from multiple ex pe1ts. Moreover, for each basic event, the user can choose the scale type from 
three options: "Fuzzy Scale", "Most Likely Value" and "Crisp". During fuzzy-analysis, the user 
can observe the sensitivity by performing alpha-cut calculation . During DST analysis, on the 
result panel, "Belief', " Plausibility" and "Bet" estimation is provided for each gate. This tool 
also generates an XML file (in future which will be used to draw a fault tree; in other words, 
application wi ll automatically draw a fault tree from a given XML file) and a PDF report. Table 
6. 1 compares features of different FTA-tools. 
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Table 6.1 : Feature comparison of proposed tool with available FT A tools 
Feature I Windchill 1CA RA-Fault 1 FaultTree+ PROF AT 2ExpertFTA 
FTA Tree 
Subjective (fuzzy-based) NC NC NC c c 
Ignorance (DST based) NC NC NC NC c 
knowledge NC NC NC NC c 
aggregat ion( mult i-Expert) 
User defined Fuzzy-scale NC NC NC NC c 
Di iTerent scales(Fuzzy, NC NC NC NC c 
most-likely, crisp) 
Alpha-cut (ruzzy-based) NC NC NC NC c 
Bet estimation(DST based) NC NC NC NC c 
FOD NC NC NC NC c 
1 A commercial software, 2 proposed FTA-tool, NC = not considered, C = considered 
6.2 Condusions and RecomntetHi<ttion 
FT A is frequently used to eva luate the operational performance, reliabi I ity predictions, 
lifetime, and system safety of complex systems. Developing a software which wi ll handle FTA is 
quiet soph isticated and complex task. This thesis introduces a software tool- ExpertFTA to draw 
and analyze a fau lt tree using fuzzy and evidence theory approach. Following sub-sections 
describe the conclusions and suggestions to improve this work. 
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(j . .!.. 1 Condu.ston'i 
As already mentioned (chapter I) that to overcome the I imitatio ns in the conventiona l 
approach o f FT A, Ferdous et a!. (2009a, 2009b) introduced two di fferent approaches (i.e., 
fuzzy-based and evidence theory-based approaches). ExpertFTA is a software tool which 
incorporated these two approaches e ffi c iently. T he fo llowing are the key features o f t :'.xpertFTA: 
• It prov ides a user a fri endl y interface to draw and modify la rge and complex fa ult 
tree. 
• It a llows users to analyze a fa ult tree us ing Fuzzy and DST approaches. So that 
users can compare the results and prepare a va luable decis ion. 
• In the Fuzzy approach, users are able to construct the ir own fuzzy-scale to input 
data, which eliminates the restriction of any pre-de fined fuzzy-sca le. 
• It supports three di fferent options for input: Fuzzy Scale, Most-Likely Va lue and 
C risp Value. 
• It has the ability to aggregate knowledge from multip le experts fo r both Fuzzy and 
DST approaches. 
• In DST, users a re able to choose fro m di ffe rent combina tion methods (e.g, Yegar, 
OS) fo r each basic event input. 
• Users can perform sens itivity analys is during the Fuzzy route by a lpha-cut 
eva luation. 
• Results from both approaches are d isplayed as gate-by-gate probability calculatio n. 
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• In the DST result-panel, Belie f, Plausibility and Bet estimation arc displayed fo r 
each Gate. 
• All inputs in the current session of the appl ication are captured and stored into an 
XML fi le for future reference. 
• A well-formatted report can be generated. 
By observing the above points, and comparing with existing FT A-tools, this tool is more 
comprehensive and robust in all aspects. 
(J. '.2 Rt'to m me 11 dc1 tio ns 
The following recommendations are made to improve this tool: 
• ExpertFT A only deals with independent events; dependency between basic events 
needs to be considered. 
• To get more robust predictions of a system is reliability/ fa ilure probabili ty, 
detailed sensitivity analysis should be introduced (i.e., fuzzy weighted index and 
cut-sets importance estimations). 
• Currently, in the DST analys is mode, there arc only two predefined FOD; an 
attempt should be made to make it user defined and incorporate other recent 
concepts. 
• Although the current version of ExpertFTA can generate XML of a fa ult tree, th is 
cannot auto generate a fault tree from a given XML. Handling this issue in the 
future would provide more usabili ty and flex ibili ty of this tool. 
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Appendix-A 
I. Analysis report from Single Expert using Fuzzy: 
Analysis Report 
Losz_if \ludr: f Ull\ I 
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GATE 6 0 909R 0 7} 99 0 ) 600 
GATE 7 0 0000 0 1001 0 2001 
-
GATES 0 0902 0 200 1 0 3000 
GA TE 9 0 0000 0.063 1 0 0961 
GATE 10 0. t 9Y9 0.6300 0.-l 99 
-
GATE ll 1.0 00 0.9919 0.96-+~ 
-
GATE 12 0.0000 0 00-+ 1 00181 
-
GATE 13 0 0000 0 00-t 1 0 01 Sl 
GATE 1-+ 0.0000 0 000 I 000 11 
-
GATE L' 0 0000 0 00-J 1 0 0!31 
-
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Basic Event's , ~ alue 
BE 2 0 . ~000 0.6000 0. 7000 
BE) 0 ~000 0 6000 0 7000 
BE 4 0 2001 0 i OOO 0 4001 
BE 5 0 .:.'00 1 0 3000 U-WO I 
=a 
BE 6 0.0000 0.1001 0.2001 
BE 7 0 0000 0.1001 0.2001 
BE S 0 2001 0 )000 0 4001 
BE 9 0 l)001 I 0000 J 0000 
BE 1(1 0.0000 0 100 1 (1 200 1 
BE 11 0.9001 1.0000 1.0000 
BE L 0.1001 0 200 1 0 3000 
BE P 0 0000 0 1001 0 2001 
BE 14 0 0000 (I 200 I 
-
BE 15 0 ~00 1 0 -tOO 1 
B 
BE 16 0.0000 0.1001 0 .2001 
BE 17 0 1001 0 200 1 0 3000 
BE IS 0 1001 0 200 1 0 3000 
-
BE )Q 0 00(10 0 1001 (I 200 I 
BE 20 l.l 001 0 200 1 u 30uu 
BE 21 0.1001 0.2001 U.3000 
BE 22 0.0000 0 0000 0 1001 
BE 2) 0 0000 0 0000 0 1001 
BE .:.'4 f) ( 000 0 )000 
BE 2S 0. 0000 u 100 1 
BE 26 0.1001 0 .200 1 cuooo 
BE 27 0.1001 0.2001 0.3000 
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Expert's Opinion 
BE I 
-
Exp~11_ 1 0.3 0 -l 0 5 
BE 2 
-
Exe e11 1 0.5 0.6 I 0. 
BE .~ 
Exp~11 1 0.5 0 .6 0 . 
BE -l 
Exp~11 1 02 0-' 0-l 
BE ~ 
-
Exper1 1 02 0 3 0-l 
Expert I 00 0 I 0 ~ 
BE 
Expert 1 00 0 1 0 ~ 
BE S 
Expc>I1 I 0 2 0 ~ 0 -l 
BE 9 
Expe11 1 09 1 0 1 0 
BE 10 
-
Exp~rt 1 00 0 .1 0 ~ 
BE 11 
-
Exp~rt_ 1 0.9 1.0 1 0 
BE 12 
-
Exp~I1 1 0.1 0 .2 0.3 
BE L\ 
-
Expc>I1 1 00 0 .1 0 2 
BE 1-l 
-
Expe11 1 00 0 I 0 2 
BE 15 
-
Expm 1 02 0 3 0 -l 
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BE 16 I 
I Expert I ou 0 I 02 
BE 1 · I 
I Expm I 0 I (I 2 0 ~ 
BE IS I 
I Expert 1 0 1 0 2 03 
BE 19 I 
I Expert 1 0 0 0 .1 0 .2 
BE .20 I 
I Exper1 l 0 .1 0 .: 0 .3 
BE 2 1 I 
I Expert I 0 I 0 2 -~ 
BE 22 I 
I Expt>rt 1 0 0 00 0 I 
BE 23 I 
I Expert 1 0 0 0 0 0 l 
BE 2-t I 
I Expert 1 0 .0 0.0 0 .1 
BE .: :; I 
I E:-.-pl'rt 1 00 0 1 0 2 
BE 26 I 
I Expcll l I) I 0 2 0 -~ 
BE 
-· 
I I 
I Ex pen I 0 1 0 2 0 ~ -' 
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2. Analysis report from Multiple Experts using Fuzzy: 
.-\n;ll~·~is Report 
I 
Gate's \ ·alue 
GATE 1 0 0001 0 00 19 0 011 -t 
"' 
GATE 2 OOL 1 0 0-tSO 0.1051 
GATE 3 0 0. 01 0.1200 0 2101 
.. 
GATE ..f 0.0300 0.05 11 0.061 5 
GATE 5 0. 7..J 76 0 ~ 670 OJS..JO 
GATE 6 0.8953 0.'..J60 0 57 2-
GATE 7 0.0268 0.0902 0.193 -t 
-
GATE S 0.0301 O.l SO I 0.2901 
GATE 9 0 02 59 0 063 1 0 0960 
m 
GATE 10 0 7'33 0.6300 0 ..J SOO 
-
GATE II 0 9993 0 99 19 0 96-t..J 
-
GATE 12 0 OOO..f 0 OO..f l 0 0180 
-
GATE 13 0 OOO..f 0 OO..f l 0 0130 
-
GATE l..f 0 0001 0 0011 0 0031 
-
GATE 15 0 OOO..f 0 00-tl 0 0180 
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Basic Event's \ ·aloe 
BE 1 0 .3000 0.-1000 0 .5000 
-
BE .2 0.5000 0.6000 0 . .1 001 
BE 3 0. 1001 0.2000 0 ~000 
$' 
BE -l 0 ~00 1 0.3000 0 -lOOO 
BE ~ 0 2000 o ~oon 0-WOO 
BE 6 OO.~H 1001 0 ~000 
BE 7 0 03 ~.t 0 tOOl 0 200 t 
BE S 0 2000 0 3000 0 -lOOO 
BE 9 0 .3001 0 9001 0 9667 
BE 10 0 .033-J 0 1001 0 2000 
-
BE 11 0 SOOI 0.9001 0 .9667 
= 
BE 1.2 0 .1001 0.2000 0 .3000 
-
BE 13 0.03 _q 0 1001 0 ~000 
.. 
BE 1-l 0 .033-l 0 1001 0.2000 
-
BE I ~ 0 .2000 0 300U U-WOu 
-
BE 16 0 33-t () lllO I 0 20UO 
-
BE 17 0 100 1 0 2000 0 1000 
-
BE 13 0 1001 0 2000 o •ooo 
-
BE 19 0 .033-1 0 tOO l 0 2000 
-
BE 20 0 100 1 0 2000 0 3000 
-
BE 21 0 1001 0.2000 0 .3000 
BE 2.2 0 .033-t 0.1001 0 .2001 
BE 23 0.033-l 0.1001 0 .2001 
= 
BE 2-J 0 .03 3-t 0. 1001 0 . .2001 
BE .2 5 0 .033-t 0 lOtH 0 20UO 
BE 26 0 .100 1 0 2000 0 3000 
_ ._ L L 
BE 27 0 .1001 0.2000 0.3000 
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Expert's Opinion 
BE 1 
Expert 1 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Expert ~ 0.4 0.5 0.6 
-
Experi 3 0.2 0 .3 O...t 
BE 2 
Experi 1 0.5 0_6 0.7 
Expert 2 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Expert 3 0.6 0.7 0.8 
BE 3 
Expert 1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
Expert ~ 0.0 0.1 0.2 
-
Expert 3 0.2 0 .3 0.-t 
BE 4 
Expeti 1 0.2 0 .3 0.-t 
Experi ~ 0.3 0.4 0.5 
-
Experi 3 0.1 0.2 OJ 
BE 5 
-
Expert 1 0.2 0 .3 0.-t 
Expert ~ 0.1 0.2 0 .3 
-
Expeti 3 0.3 0.4 0.5 
BE 6 
Expeti 1 0.0 0.1 0 .2 
Expert 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Expert 3 0.1 0.2 0 .3 
BE 7 
-
Expert 1 0.0 0.1 0.2 
Expert ~ 0.1 0 .2 0 3 
-
Expert 3 0.0 0.0 0.1 
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BE 3 I 
I Expert 1 0 .~ 0.3 04 
I Expert 2 0.1 0.2 0.3 
I Expert 3 0.3 O...t 0.5 
BE 9 I 
I Expert 1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
I Expett 2 0.8 0.9 1.0 
I Expert 3 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BE 10 I 
I Expert 1 0.0 0.1 0.2 
I Expert 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
I Expert 3 0.1 0.2 0.3 
BE 11 I 
I Expett 1 0.9 1.0 1.0 
I Expert 2 0.8 0.9 1.0 
I Expert 3 0.7 0.8 0.9 
BE 1 ~ I 
I Expert 1 0.1 0.2 0.3 
I Expert 2 0.0 0.1 0.2 
I Expett 3 0 . ~ 0.3 0.4 
I 
BE 13 I 
I Expt>tt 1 0(1 0 1 02 
I Expert , 00 00 0 l -
I Expet1 3 0.1 0 2 0) 
BE 1 -~ I 
I Expt>rt) tJ.O 0.1 02 
I Expt>rt , 00 00 0 1 ·-
I Expt>r1 > _, 0.1 0 .2 0.3 
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BE 15 I 
I Expert 1 I 0.2 0 .3 0 -1 
I E.xpe11 ..: I 0. 1 0.2 0 J 
I Ex~ert 3 I 0.3 0.-1 0.5 
BE 16 I 
I Ex~m 1 I 00 0 1 02 I 
I Expm : I 00 0 0 I I 
I Ex~t-11 ~ I 0 1 (I 2 0, -' I 
BE 17 I 
I Expert 1 I 0.1 0 .2 0 3 
Expet1 _ I 0.0 0.1 0 2 
I Exeert_3 I 0.2 0.3 0 -l 
BE IS I 
I ExEert .. l I 0 1 0 2 0 3 
I Expt-11 2 I 00 0 1 0 ., 
I Expe11 ~ I 0 2 0 3 0 -t 
BE 19 I 
I Expc11 1 I IJ.O 0 .1 02 
I Expert _ I 0.0 (1 0 cu 
I Ex~ert 3 I I) 1 0. 2 03 
BE 20 I 
I Expt>rt .. l I 0 1 (I 2 0 :; 
I Expt>11 ~:: I no 0 1 0 ., 
I Expl'l1 -~ I 02 0.3 0 -t 
BE 21 I 
I Expc11 1 I U. l 0.2 (_)__) 
I Expe11 ~ I 0.0 0.1 02 
I Ex~t>t1 ~ I 02 OJ 0 -l 
BE 22 I 
I Expt>rt l I 0 0 () 0 0 I 
I Expt.>11 2 I 00 0 l 0 ., 
I Exp~11 3 I 0 1 02 03 
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BE 23 I 
I Expert 1 0.0 0.0 0. 1 
I Expert 1 0.0 0.1 0.2 -
I Expert 3 0.1 0.2 0 .3 
BE 24 I 
I Expert 1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
I Expert 2 0.0 0 .1 0 . .2 
I 3 Expert_ 0.1 0 .2 0 .3 
BE 25 I 
I Expert l 0.0 0.1 0 .2 
I Expert 2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
I Expert 3 0.1 0 .2 0 .3 
BE 26 I 
l Expert 1 0.1 0 2 03 
I Expe11 2 00 0 1 02 
I Expe11 ' 0.2 0.3 0.-J .' 
BE 21 I 
I Expert_! 0 l 02 03 
I Expert ' 00 0 1 02 -
I Expe11 _, 02 0 3 0.--l 
A.lpha-Cut Results 
P. 1'3 
0.0095 
0.35 0 0008 0.0019 0.008 1 
0.56 0.0012 0.0019 0.0061 
0.75 0.00 15 0.00 19 0.00-B 
0.15 0.0004 0.0019 0.0100 
0.-+5 0.0010 0.0019 0.0072 
0.65 0.0013 0.0019 0.0053 
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3. Analysis report from Single Expert using OST: 
.-\nalysis Report 
C l t"rtlion Timr: Sun FtiJ 19 ~0 : 04 : 1 1> ~~T 2011 
I 
Gate's \ 7 alue 
GATE 1 0.0237 0.0267 0.0~5~ 
-
GATE 2 0.4684 0.4687 0.4686 
GATE 3 0.5203 0.5205 0.5204 
GATE 4 0.3599 0.3-t-49 0.3524 
GATE 5 0.--1-001 0 .4002 0.400~ 
GATE 6 0.4001 0.4.251 0.41.26 
-
GATE ... I 0 0490 0.0490 0.0490 
-
GATE 8 0.1224 0.1223 0.1224 
GATE 9 0.2520 0 .2928 o.2n4 
GATE 10 0 0~21 0.022 1 0.0221 
GATE 11 0.001 5 0.001 5 0.0015 
GATE 12 0.0700 0.0699 0.0700 
-
GATE 13 0.9004 0.88-H 0.8923 
GATE 14 0.0023 0 .0023 0 .0023 
GATE 15 0.0976 0.1139 0.1058 
-
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Basic Event's \ '"alue 
BE I 0 900.::! 0 9003 
-
BE ' 0 3002 0 S003 -
-
BE ' 0 6~02 0 6 503 _, 
-
BE -t 0.5000 0.5000 
-
BE 
" 
0.3002 O.S003 
BE 6 0.3002 0.8502 
BE 7 0 .5000 0 5000 
n 
BE S 0 -W02 0.-1003 
BE 9 0 6502 0 65(13 
BE 10 0 650.::! 0 6 503 
-
BE II 0 7000 0 750 1 
-
BE 12 0 6000 0.6000 
-
BE 13 0.6000 0.6503 
-
BE 1-t 0.100 1 0.100 1 
-
BE 15 0 -t002 0.-1003 
-
BE 16 0.5502 0.5503 
BE I 7 0 200.:! 0 2002 
-
BE IS 0 100 1 0 1001 
-
BE 19 0 5000 0 5000 
-
BE 20 0 )000 0 3000 
-
BE 21 0 3002 0 3003 
-
BE '~ 0 3000 0 3000 
- -
-
BE 23 0.050 1 0.0501 
BE 2-t 0.1500 0.1500 
BE 25 0 6502 0 6503 
BE 26 0 3000 0 3502 
B£- ., 0 .5000 0.5000 
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Expert's Opinion 
BE l 
-
Expert l 0 I 09 
BE~ 
Expert I 0~ OS 
BE 3 
Expert I 0 35 0 65 
BE~ 
Expert I 0 5 0 5 
BE 5 
-
Expert 1 0~ OS 
BE 6 
Expert 1 0 15 OS 
BE -
-
Expert_! 0.5 0 5 
BE S 
Expc:>rt=l 0.6 OA 
BE 9 
Ex~c:>rt _1 0.35 0.65 
BE 10 
-
Expc:>t1.) 0.35 0.65 
BE II 
-
Expert 1 0 ~ 5 0 7 
BE L ! 
-
Expert I 0 ~ 06 
BE 1 ' _, 
-
Expert I 0 35 06 
BE 1-l 
-
Expert 1 09 0 1 
BE 15 
-
Expert 1 06 0-1 
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BE 16 I 
I Expett 1 0.45 0.55 
BE 17 I 
I Expett 1 0.8 0 . ~ 
BE 18 I 
I Expett 1 0.9 0.1 
BE 19 I 
I Expett 1 0.5 0.5 
BE ~0 I 
I Expett 1 0.7 0.3 
BE ~ 1 I 
I Expett 1 0 . ~ O.S 
BE ~2 I 
I Expett 1 0 7 0.3 
BE ~3 I 
I Expett 1 0.95 0.05 
BE ~-l I 
I Expett 1 0.85 0.15 
BE 2 ~ I 
I EX{k'I"t 1 0 3::-. 0.65 
BE ~6 I 
I Exp:1t 1 (l 6:- 0 ~ 
BE 2- I 
I Exp.c>tt,.l 0 :' 0~ 
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4. Analysis report from Multiple Experts using DST: 
. \nalysis Report 
( ··taiiOII Timt-: ')till ff'b 05 .!! :-49 :.' .' ~') r .!U I ~ I 
I 
GATE 1 0.0088 0.01 ~-t 0.0106 
-
GA TE 2 0 62S..t 0 . 73:' 1 0. -068 
GA TE -~ 0 6-L :\ 0 SU09 
GA TE ..t u 1.?6-i no~ I ~' 
GATE 'i 0 192-l 0 'i 20-t 
GATE 6 08-H ..t 0 SQ_:q 0 36S-t 
GATE 7 0.1080 0.0606 O.OB-t3 
G ATE S 0 2059 O.OS07 0.1-tJ.?> 
GATE 9 0 .6606 0.7377 0. -~-t~ 
GATE 10 0.0073 021 :'7 0.11 L 
GA TE 11 O.ll06.? 0 .() 136 0. 0099 
LrATE 1_ 0 ~ 1 6) 0 04 ; _f 0 . 18~0 
GATE 1 ~ o 90QS 0 6Ct99 
G A TE 1-t 0 00 1-' OO-PS 0 0226 
GATE 1:; 0 0391 0 36~2 
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Basic _Event's Value 
BE 1 0.9-;35 0.980~ 
-
BE ") 09604 0 9'01 
-
-
BE 3 0 6-2 1 0 "25 5 
-
BE -t 0.6000 0.3002 
BE -; 0 3~06 0.6503 
= 
BE 6 0 909 -~ 0 9-lO' 
BE 0 92 75 0 9501 
BE s 0.5242 0. 7502 
-
BE 9 0 2 ~0 1 0 42 ~4 
BE J(l 0 7~6 1 0 8602 
-
BE 11 0.3)39 O.Yl O_, 
-
BE 12 085 7 _~ 0 9202 
-
BE 13 0 90-.~ 0 9-W.< 
-
BE l-l 0 100_ 0.5503 
-
BE l :' 0 . 143~ 0.5203 
= 
BE 16 0 500.:1 0 52S 
-
BE 1- 0 1-l3 2 0 5203 
-
BE l O.U-t9 0.5:•03 
-
BE 19 0.:1003 0 7003 
?3 
BE :'0 0 120 1 0 2090 
-
BE 21 0 4003 lt .S005 
-
BE ) ) (J 0600 0.0968 
--
-
BE ..,, _ , 0 061) 7 0 5-2S 
-
BE 24 0 J-l 63 0.7S30 
-
BE 
'" 
0.6U3S 0.3081 
-
BE 26 0 3(1Q7 0.6180 
-
BE 2.1 0 .-t 76-t 0 .' 250 
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Expert's Opinion 
BE 1 
-
Expert 1 0 1 09 
Expert ' 0 . ~ OS -
Expt>t1 3 0 .3 o-
BE 2 
-
Expert_! 0 . ~ O.S 
Expert , 0 1 0 S:i 
-
BE ' ::0 
-
Expet1 1 0.35 0 65 
Expet1 ' 0 -' ) 0:' 
-
BE -t 
-
Expet1 I 0.5 0.5 
Expert ' 0 -' 06 
-
BE 5 
-
Expert 1 0 -' :" 0 5 
Expert ) 0 7 0 3 
-
BE 6 
-
Expt>rt 1 (I 2 OS 
Expert ' 0. ~5 o.--
BE 7 
-
Expert 1 0 1) OS 
Expet1 ' 0 .25 0.75 
-
BE 3 
-
Expert 1 0 5 0 5 
Expert , 0.~ 5 0.5 
-
BE 9 
-
Expet1 I 0.6 0 -' 
Expt>rt .., 0 ~ 5 05 
-
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BE 10 I 
I Expt't'f 1 0.3:- 0.65 
I Exp~t'f ~ 0-l 06 
-
BE 11 I 
l £.Xp?11 1 0.25 (1_7 
I EXfh'11 l 0 ~ 0 1 
BE 12 I 
l Exp~tt=l 0.4 0.6 
I Exp~t1_2 02 (I~ 
BE U I 
l Exp~t1 l o __ ,s U.6 
I Exp~t1) 0 15 0 S:'i 
BE 1-1 I 
l Ex~t1 l 0.9 (I 1 
I EXJX'I'f 2 05 05 
I Expt>tt ~ 0 7 0 ' 
·' 
BE 15 I 
I Exp::t1.,1 06 0 -l 
I Expt>t'f ~ OS (I~ 
-
BE 16 I 
Expeti 1 0 ·15 0 :'5 
l Expt?tt ~ 0 5:" 0 .J) -
BE P l 
I Expe11 l 03 0 2 
I Expett l 06 0-l 
BE I ~ I 
I Expet1~ l (J<.J 0 I 
I Expet10 2 0 -~ 0 ~ 
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BE 19 I 
I Expt>Jt 1 0 _5 0_5 
I Expert 2 0_6 0_4 
I Expert 3 0_6 0_4 
BE 20 I 
I Expert 1 0_7 0_3 
I Expt>lt 2 0_6 0.35 
BE 21 I 
I Expe1t 1 0_2 0_8 
I Expert 2 0_5 0_5 
BE 22 I 
I Expe1t 1 0_7 0_3 
I Expert 2 OS 0_2 
BE 23 I 
I Expert 1 0.95 0 .05 
I Expe1t 2 O.-t5 0.55 
BE 24 I 
Expe1t 1 0_85 0.15 
I Expert 2 0.25 0_75 
BE 25 I 
I Expt>rt 1 0.35 0.65 
I Expert 2 0.55 O..l5 
BE 26 I 
I Expe1t 1 0.65 0_3 
I Expe1t 2 0_5 0.45 
BE 27 I 
I Expen 1 0_5 05 
I Expe1t 2 0_5 O..l5 
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